Uncertain Fiscal Consolidations*

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Abstract

In a non-linear New Keynesian economy, we explore the macro-economic consequences of undertaking fiscal consolidations of uncertain timing and composition. Following the empirical evidence in Alesina and Ardagna (2010), we place particular emphasis on whether or not the fiscal consolidation is driven by tax rises or expenditure cuts. We find that the composition of the fiscal consolidation, its duration, the monetary policy stance, the level of government debt and expectations over the likelihood and composition of fiscal consolidations all matter in determining the extent to which a given consolidation is expansionary and/or successful.

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1 Introduction

The financial crisis of 2007-9 has left the advanced economies with average levels of gross government debt relative to GDP breaching the 100% level for the first time since the aftermath of World War II (IMF (2011)). As a result, the IMF expects most governments of such economies, with the notable exception of Japan and the United States, to begin consolidation efforts by 2012. The expected pace of consolidation is particularly rapid in those economies subject to pressures in the financial markets due to worries over fiscal sustainability, see IMF (2011). Moreover, politicians in some economies, such as the UK, argue that fiscal consolidations will ultimately be growth enhancing and cite the need to avoid the possibility of rising debt costs as a key motivation in undertaking fiscal consolidations even in the absence of any current significant risk premia on government debt. It, therefore, appears to be the case that the dominant medium-term fiscal trend in such economies is the need to return to a position of fiscal sustainability, particularly when prompted to do so through rising costs of servicing government debt possibly due to fears of default/restructuring.

Conventional Keynesian analysis suggests that fiscal consolidations inevitably lead to a contraction in aggregate demand, and thereby lost output. However, following Giavazzi and Pagano (1990)’s analysis of fiscal consolidations in Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s, it appeared that such fiscal actions could be expansionary, since output growth actually accelerated following the fiscal tightening. A large volume of subsequent empirical work has considered a wider set of countries over a wider time period and has also found some evidence that fiscal consolidations can potentially be expansionary. The literature does not always fully agree on the relative importance of different factors in determining whether or not a consolidation will be either expansionary and/or successful (in the sense of achieving a sustained reduction in the government debt to GDP ratio). Nevertheless, it appears that the persistence and composition of the consolidation matters, with cuts to government spending being thought to be pro-growth relative to tax increases (see, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1995), Perotti (1996), Alesina and Ardagna (1998, 2010), and Ardagna (2004)). Other factors, which are considered by the literature, include the size of consolidation (Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) and Von Hagen and Strauch (2001)), the state of the public finances at the time of the consolidation (see, for example, Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000)) and, the state of the macroeconomy at the time of the consolidation (Perotti (1999), Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006), Guichard, Kennedy, Wurzel, and Andre (2007)), whether or not monetary and/or exchange rate policy is accommodative at the time of the consolidation (Von Hagen and Strauch (2001), Ardagna (2004), Lambertini and Tavares (2005)), the nature

\[\text{For a survey of the literature, see Briotti (2005).}\]
of the political institutions undertaking the consolidation (Alesina (2000), Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006)). However, it is important to note that in many cases where one study finds a conditioning variable to be significant, another study will not - for example, while Lambertini and Tavares (2005) find that accompanying exchange rate devaluations help ensure fiscal consolidations are successful, Ardagna (2004) does not, and where Alesina and Ardagna (2010) find that the composition of consolidations affects both how expansionary and successful a consolidation is, Ardagna (2004) argues that composition does not matter for success. Our non-linear model can help explain these conflicting results in that we find significant non-linear interactions between debt levels, the monetary policy stance, the compositions of consolidations and expectations about the nature of fiscal consolidations now or in the future, which are unlikely to be controlled for by adding individual variables to linear regressions or sorting samples according to a single variable.

While much of the literature on fiscal consolidations is empirical, the implicit theoretical mechanisms underpinning the results are sometimes discussed. Briotti (2005) identifies three conditions under which we could achieve an expansionary fiscal consolidation in a simple neoclassical setting. Firstly, households must undertake intertemporal consumption smoothing, such that their current consumption depends not just on current income, but expected future income. Secondly, taxes must be distortionary. This implies that a timely consolidation implies that households no longer fear a larger and more costly consolidation in the future. This raises expected income and fuels the expansion. Thirdly, for such a consolidation to be expansionary, it must be unexpected/uncertain otherwise there would be no sense of relief that the consolidation was actually underway. Moreover, although the nature and timing of a fiscal consolidation may be uncertain, in order to motivate the need to condition regressions on the state of the economy, the size of the consolidation and the state of the public finances, the literature also often suggests that such variables provide additional information about future policies. For example, Bertola and Drazen (1993) develop a model where government spending is inherently unsustainable, but the government will satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint by periodically undertaking fiscal consolidations through spending cuts. These consolidations may occur at a low threshold, but if not, they will definitely occur at a second higher threshold. The current state, therefore, provides information about the likelihood of consolidations, and we may observe an expansion following a worsening fiscal position as this raises the probability that we shall shortly enter a period of beneficial fiscal correction. Similarly, Sutherland (1997) suggests that there will be non-linearities in the economic impact of fiscal policy associated with the level of government debt. At high debt levels fiscal consolidation is imminent, and in an economy populated with finitely-lived Blanchard-Yaari consumers this means that current generations will bear the
tax costs of the consolidation, while at lower debt levels consolidation is delayed and future generations are more likely to bear the costs of future fiscal corrections. Therefore a given deficit financed tax cut may have quite different consequences at different levels of debt. In the light of these considerations, we extend Bertola and Drazen (1993) to include distortionary taxation, in order to provide a simple example which shows how the uncertainty over the timing and composition of fiscal consolidations can affect whether or not a realized consolidation is expansionary.

Following on from this example highlighting the importance of expectations, we develop a non-linear DSGE model where fiscal consolidations occur with increasing probability as government debt levels rise. While the probability of consolidation is rising in debt levels, the exact timing of the consolidation is uncertain. This is consistent with the empirical observation that sizeable consolidations can take place at low as well as high debt/GDP ratios. We further introduce uncertainty over the composition of the fiscal consolidation. To do so we analyze the dataset of Alesina and Ardagna (2010) who define fiscal consolidations within OECD economies between 1970 and 2007 as either being expansionary or contractionary. Within each type of consolidation we compute the mean of the changes in government spending, fiscal transfers and tax revenues (all relative to GDP) during the course of a fiscal consolidation. In other words we have an empirical measure of two typical types of consolidation, which reveals that ‘expansionary’ fiscal consolidations are typically based on cuts in government spending, while ‘contractionary’ consolidations usually rely on tax increases. Using the relative frequency of ‘expansionary’ and ‘contractionary’ consolidations observed in the data, we assume that when a fiscal consolidation is undertaken it is either tax or expenditure based. This allows us to assess which type of consolidation turns out to be expansionary and which contractionary, and whether it is the resolution of the uncertainty associated with the timing or composition of fiscal consolidations that matters most in determining whether or not it is expansionary and/or successful.

The plan of the paper is as follows. Below we discuss the empirical evidence in Alesina and Ardagna (2010) describing the nature of large-scale fiscal consolidations. Section 3 then provides a simple example where uncertainty over the timing and composition of fiscal consolidations can deliver expansionary fiscal consolidations in a neoclassic setting. Section 4 then outlines our richer New Keynesian model, monetary and fiscal policies and the range of state-dependent fiscal consolidations that may occur. Section 5 describes the fiscal limit which determines the state-dependent probability of observing a fiscal consolidation. In Alesina and Perotti (1997) also argue that the response to changes in tax rates may be quite different depending on the extent and nature of union wage bargaining in an economy. Although our economy does not contain such distortions, there are non-linearities associated with Laffer curve effects arising from the distortionary taxation of labor income.
Section 6 we describe the calibration and solution for our non-linear model, before considering a wide range of fiscal consolidations in Sections 7 and 8. We reach our conclusions in Section 9.

2 Fiscal Consolidations Data

In this section, we outline the features of the dataset on fiscal consolidations constructed by Alesina and Ardagna (2010) (henceforth AA).

AA undertake an empirical analysis of episodes of fiscal stimulus (rise in deficit/fall in surplus) and fiscal adjustment (fall in deficit/rise in surplus) of more than 1.5% of GDP, where the data is cyclically adjusted. Each such episode is then classified as being ‘expansionary’ if GDP growth in the two years following the stimulus/adjustment is greater than the 75th percentile of the same variable empirical density in all episodes of fiscal stimulus/adjustment. They also define a ‘successful’ fiscal adjustment as being where the debt/GDP ratio falls by 4.5% three years later. Using data for a sample of developed OECD economies between 1970 and 2007, there are 107 episodes of fiscal adjustment amounting to 15.1% of the observations in their sample. Of these 107 episodes, 65 last for one period/year, 13 last two years, 4 last three years and 1 fiscal adjustment episode lasts for four years. While 26 years of fiscal consolidation fulfill AA’s definition of expansionary fiscal consolidations, such that one in four fiscal consolidations are deemed expansionary. We use these latter two observations to calibrate both the typical length of time spent in an episode of consolidation and the relative frequency of consolidations that AA would label ‘expansionary’ and ‘contractionary’, respectively.

We then follow AA to compute the average change in key fiscal variables in the two years following a fiscal consolidation relative to the two years prior to the fiscal adjustment. Our numbers differ slightly from those in AA as we exclude consolidations where we do not have observations either prior to, or following the episode. We do this as we wish to assess the statistical significance of the changes in fiscal variables over the course of a consolidation episode. Table 1 details the average change in fiscal variables under both types of consolidation, where all variables are measured relative to output.

Table 1 reveals some quite striking differences between episodes which meet AA’s definitions of expansionary and contractionary, respectively. Expansionary consolidations feature a statistically significant fall in government spending of 2.19% of GDP and subsidies of 0.32%, and a statistically insignificant rise in tax revenues of 0.35% and fall in transfers of 0.58% of GDP. There are also statistically significant falls in public investment and public-sector wages, of 0.76% and 0.4%, respectively, although these tend to be similar across both types of consolidation. In contrast, contractionary consolidations have a far smaller fall in govern-
ment spending of only 0.8%, as well as a stastically significant rise in tax revenues transfers of 1.11% and 0.47%, respectively. In other words the fiscal consolidations which meet the definition of expansionary in AA’s dataset are driven by spending cuts with no significant increases in aggregate tax revenues, while the contractionary episodes are far more heavily dependent on increases in taxation, particularly business and indirect taxes.

Given the significant differences across consolidation regimes apply to aggregate spending and taxation, we focus on these fiscal variables in our theoretical model(s) below.

### 3 A Simple Example of Fiscal Consolidation

In this section we outline a simple endowment open-economy which highlights the role expectations may play in determining whether or not a fiscal consolidation is expansionary. To do so, we employ the model of Bertola and Drazen (1993) augmented with distortionary taxation. The small open economy assumption allows us to generate analytical results in a simple endowment economy in which households still face meaningful consumption/saving decisions. This enables us to explore the expectation effects of uncertainty over both the composition of fiscal consolidations (tax versus spending) and their timing and the implications of such uncertainty for the existence of expansionary consolidations. In the next section we develop a far richer New Keynesian economy which can be plausibly calibrated to the data, to assess the quantitative importance of these mechanisms.

Household utility is given by,

$$E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s u(c_{t+s})$$

and is maximized subject to the household’s budget constraint,

$$\beta a_{t+1} = a_t + y(1 - \tau_t - \psi(\tau_t)^2) - c_t$$

where $y$ is the household’s endowment income, $a_t$ is the household’s holdings of financial assets at the start of period $t$, and gross interest is earned on those assets at the world rate of interest, $1/\beta$. $\tau_t$ is the tax rate on endowment income, which attracts deadweight losses of $y\psi(\tau_t)^2$. In this simple economy this could be motivated by allowing for tax avoidance activities in an environment where the tax authorities find it difficult to measure the household’s endowment income, but more generally captures the costs of distortionary taxation in economies with a more sophisticated supply side.\(^3\) The household’s intertemporal budget

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\(^3\)In our New Keynesian DSGE model of Section 4, we have a distortionary tax on labor income. Moreover, sticky prices imply that there are additional distortions caused by the inflation consequences of changes in distortionary taxation and government spending.
constraint can be written as,

$$\sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s E_t c_{t+s} = a_t + E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s y(1 - \tau_{t+s} - \psi(\tau_{t+s})^2) \tag{3}$$

The optimal consumption plan of the household satisfies,

$$u_c(t) = E_t u_c(t + s) \tag{4}$$

and we assume a quadratic utility function so that this implies pure consumption smoothing,

$$c_t = E_t c_{t+s} \tag{5}$$

In other words it is only surprises in the either the nature or timing of fiscal consolidations that will give rise to jumps in consumption. Anticipated cuts in government spending and/or tax rises will only affect consumption at the time when they are news.

The government’s flow budget constraint is given by,

$$\beta b_{t+1} = b_t - y_t + g_t \tag{6}$$

implying the intertemporal budget constraint,

$$b_t = E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s y_{t+s} - E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s g_{t+s} \tag{7}$$

Combining with the household’s budget constraint and given the consumption smoothing behavior on the part of the household this implies,

$$\frac{c_t}{1 - \beta} = (a_t - b_t) + E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s y(1 - \psi(\tau_{t+s})^2) - E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s g_{t+s} \tag{8}$$

where $a_t - b_t$ are the net foreign assets held by households. We shall use this expression to consider the impact on consumption of alternative compositions and timings of fiscal consolidations.

We assume that there are initial levels of government spending, $g^0$ and tax rates, $\tau^0$ which are insufficient to satisfy the government’s IBC. As a result debt is increasing, and will have reached a level $b_{t+n}$, $n$ periods from now where $b_{t+n}$ is found by accumulating the
government’s flow budget constraint forwards n periods,

\[ b_{t+n} = \beta^{-n} b_t - \beta^{-n} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \beta^s y^0 + \beta^{-n} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \beta^s g^0 \] (9)

We now consider two types of uncertainty in relation to the fiscal consolidations necessary to stabilize the unstable debt dynamics. Specifically, we allow for uncertainty in the timing of the fiscal consolidation, before considering uncertainty in the composition of the fiscal consolidation i.e. whether or not it is tax- or spending-based.

3.1 The Timing of Consolidations  We begin by considering uncertainty over the timing of fiscal consolidations. In our simple model there is really only one channel through which the timing of fiscal consolidations can affect the likelihood of an expansionary consolidation and that is through the non-linearities associated with the deadweight losses caused by distortionary taxation. We know from the government’s budget constraint a combination of spending cuts or tax increases must be implemented to stabilize an unstable debt trajectory. In the absence of deadweight losses, the timing of these tax and expenditure changes don’t matter in our simple endowment economy and for both instruments it is as if the usual mechanisms for Ricardian Equivalence hold so that any unexpected delays in the fiscal consolidation would have no effect, provided fiscal policy ultimately satisfies the intertemporal budget constraint. However, in the presence of deadweight losses from distortionary taxation we know that the discounted value of these losses erodes the resources available to the household for consumption. Therefore to the extent that a tax based consolidation is delayed, the required tax increase rises and the deadweight losses associated with this rise even faster.

To see this more clearly consider the household’s intertemporal budget constraint, in the presence of pure consumption smoothing,

\[ \frac{c_t}{1-\beta} = a_t + E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s y(1 - \tau_{t+s} - \psi(\tau_{t+s})^2) \] (10)

here we know that the discounted value of tax revenues must be sufficient to support the outstanding stock of government debt given the discounted sum of government expenditure. Altering the timing of a tax-based consolidation will not affect the size of the discounted tax revenues needed to maintain fiscal solvency. However, changing the timing of a tax based
fiscal consolidation will affect the expected discounted sum of the deadweight losses,

\[ E_t \sum_{s=0}^{\infty} \beta^s y(\psi(\tau_{t+s})^2) \] (11)

From familiar tax smoothing arguments, the discounted sum of these deadweight losses will be minimized by implementing an immediate one-off increase in the tax rate to a level sufficient to generate the tax revenues necessary to satisfy the IBC. Any delay in the implementation of the consolidation implies a deviation from tax smoothing and will raise the discounted value of deadweight losses. Accordingly an unexpected delay in a tax based fiscal consolidation will reduce consumption, while an unexpectedly prompt fiscal consolidation will increase it, cet. par.

3.2 Composition Uncertainty

We now consider composition uncertainty. We assume that households expect there to be a fiscal consolidation \( n \) periods from now, such that fiscal policy will change taxes or government spending to new levels which satisfy the IBC at the level of debt, \( b_{t+n} \). Households expect the fiscal consolidation to be spending based with probability \( q \), and tax based with probability \( 1 - q \). Accordingly, the level of government spending observed under a spending based consolidation, \( g^1 \), is given by,

\[ g^1 = y\tau^0 - (1 - \beta)b_{t+n} \] (12)

where tax rates remain as they were before the fiscal consolidation, \( \tau^0 \).

While in the case of a tax based consolidation the new tax rate, \( \tau^1 \), solves the following condition,

\[ y\tau^1 = g^0 + (1 - \beta)b_{t+n} \] (13)

Note that since government debt was assumed to be on an unsustainable trajectory, the government-spending based consolidation implies a cut in government spending, and a tax based consolidation implies an increase in tax revenues of an equal amount. This will ensure that debt is stabilized at the level \( b_{t+n} \) from that point onwards. Consumption under each type of consolidation, from period \( t + n \) onwards is given by,

\[ c^{\text{tax}} = (1 - \beta)(a_{t+n} - b_{t+n}) + y(1 - \psi(\tau^1)^2) - g^0 \] (14)

and,

\[ c^{\text{spending}} = (1 - \beta)(a_{t+n} - b_{t+n}) + y(1 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - g^1 \] (15)

which implies that consumption is higher following the government spending based consoli-
ation than under the tax based consolidation.

Prior to the consolidation consumption will lie somewhere between these two cases, such that there will be a positive (negative) jump in consumption at the point when the consolidation is revealed to be spending- (tax-) based. However, the exact size of this jump depends upon expectations prior to the realization of the consolidation. Consumption prior to the consolidation will be given by,

\[
c_0 = (1 - \beta)(a_t - b_t) + (1 - \beta) \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \beta^s y(1 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - (1 - \beta) \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} \beta^s g^0
\]

\[
+ \beta^n (qy(1 - \psi(\tau^0)^2 + (1 - q)y(1 - \psi(\tau^1)^2)
\]

\[- \beta^n (qg^1 + (1 - q)g^0)
\]

That is, consumption prior to consolidation takes account of the accumulation of government debt that takes place in the \(n\)-periods prior to the consolidation, and also attaches appropriate probability weights to the types of consolidation that will ultimately emerge. This can be seen more clearly by rewriting this as,

\[
c_0 = (1 - \beta)(a_t - b_t) + y(1 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - g^0
\]

\[- \beta^n ((1 - q)y(\psi(\tau^1)^2 - \psi(\tau^0)^2)
\]

\[+ \beta^n (q(g^0 - g^1))
\]

(16)

where the current consumption gain (loss) to an anticipated government spending (taxation) based consolidation are clear.

Therefore the impact of composition uncertainty can be summarized as follows. When economic agents know a consolidation will take place, but are unsure what form it will take, their current consumption will reflect the relative probabilities they attach to each type of consolidation. Since these expectations drive current consumption, they also affect current saving behavior and to the extent that economic agents anticipate a future cut in government spending, current consumption will rise, while if they fear a future rise in taxes current consumption will fall. While the magnitude of the realized spending cuts or tax increases is unaffected by these expectations, since they do not affect debt dynamics prior to the consolidation in our simple model, the accumulation of net foreign assets is affected.

Combining the government’s and households’ flow budget constraints implies that, prior
to the fiscal consolidation, net foreign assets evolve according to,

$$\beta(a_{t+1} - b_{t+1}) = a_t - b_t + y(1 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - c^0 - g^0$$  \hspace{1cm} (18)

so that, substituting for the pre-consolidation level of consumption we have,

$$\beta^n [(1 - q) y \psi(\tau^1)^2 - (\tau^0)^2 - q(g^0 - g^1)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (19)

and, the accumulated change in net foreign assets between today and the fiscal consolidation in period $t+n$ is given by,

$$\beta^{n-1} \sum_{s=0}^{n-1} [(1 - q) y \psi((\tau^1)^2 - (\tau^0)^2) - q(g^0 - g^1)]$$  \hspace{1cm} (20)

In other words when the expected deadweight losses from the tax increase $(1 - q) y \psi(\tau^1)^2 - (\tau^0)^2$ are greater than the expected cut in government spending, $q(g^0 - g^1)$, households will be accumulating net foreign assets in anticipation of the costs of the deadweight losses to come. Since these expectations are formed over the relative probabilities of each type of consolidation, households will accumulate more (less) net foreign assets when they anticipate that the consolidation will be tax (spending) based.

Upon realization of a spending based consolidation the jump in consumption is given by,

$$c^{\text{spending}} - c^0 = (1 - \beta)((a_{t+n} - b_{t+n}) - (a_t - b_t)) + g^0 - g^1$$  \hspace{1cm} (21)

$$+ \beta^n ((1 - q) y \psi(\tau^1)^2 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - q(g^0 - g^1))$$

which will exceed the cut in government expenditure and be classed as expansionary whenever,

$$c^{\text{spending}} - c^0 > g^0 - g^1$$  \hspace{1cm} (22)

which requires,

$$\beta^{n-1} [(1 - q) y \psi((\tau^1)^2 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) - q(g^0 - g^1)] > 0$$  \hspace{1cm} (23)

This condition depends solely on the terms in the square bracket, implying we shall observe an expansionary fiscal consolidation upon realization of a spending-based consolidation whenever,

$$(1 - q) y (\psi(\tau^1)^2 - \psi(\tau^0)^2) > q(g^0 - g^1)$$  \hspace{1cm} (24)

that is the expected size of tax distortions (not the tax revenues themselves) must exceed the expected size of the government expenditure cut, where those expectations reflect eco-
nomic agents’ view as to the relative probability of each type of consolidation. While if the consolidation turns out to be tax based, it can never be expansionary.

Moreover, any delay in the consolidation raises the required increases in tax revenues or cuts in expenditure given that we are assuming that the government’s finances are on an unsustainable path initially. Since the deadweight losses are non-linearly increasing in the tax rate, the deadweight losses associated with tax increases will be rising faster than the equivalent cuts in expenditure. This implies that this condition is more likely to hold if the consolidation is delayed. Taken together this implies that we are more likely to observe an expansionary fiscal consolidation when that consolidation has been long delayed and economic agents were expecting the consolidation that emerged to be tax-based with very high associated levels of deadweight loss, when, in fact, the consolidation that emerged was actually spending based. Therefore to maximize the consumption boom upon undertaking a fiscal consolidation the realized consolidation should be spending based, and economic agents should have been expecting it to be tax-based. Conversely, the biggest consumption falls upon consolidation will occur when the consolidation is tax based and economic agents were expecting cuts in government spending. Moreover, the realization of an unexpectedly prompt consolidation which reduces the risk of larger and more costly consolidations in the future should also boost consumption, cet. par.

We shall explore the importance of uncertainty over the timing and composition of fiscal consolidations in a fully-fledged DSGE model below. However, our experiments will differ from this simple example in a crucial respect: in line with the data, we shall consider temporary consolidations rather than permanent ones. This will tend to make it very difficult for these expectational effects to overturn the contractionary effects of a temporary fiscal contraction while the consolidation is being implemented. Nevertheless, the expectational factors highlighted in the simple example could potentially mitigate the short-run costs of a fiscal consolidation and enhance the benefits experienced upon completing the consolidation.

4 Model

Having established the potential for uncertainty over the composition and/or timing of fiscal consolidations to matter for their macroeconomic outcome, our aim is to explore the macroeconomic consequences of uncertain fiscal consolidations in a richer, and more plausible, modelling environment. Since debt service costs are particularly important in determining debt dynamics at high debt levels, we consciously use a conventional new Keynesian model of the kind typically used to explore monetary and fiscal policy interactions, modified by allowing (locally) explosive lump-sum transfers and occasional fiscal consolidations which are uncertain in both their timing and composition.
Households in our economy supply labor to imperfectly competitive intermediate goods producing firms who do not completely adjust prices in the face of shocks since they face costly Rotemberg-style price adjustment. Moreover, rather than rendering fiscal policy redundant by balancing the budget through lump-sum taxes, we assume that households’ labor and profit income is taxed. This influences their labor supply decisions, which in turn affects firms’ marginal costs and pricing decisions. Taken together, this implies a relatively rich set of monetary and fiscal policy interactions: monetary policy has real effects due to the assumption of price stickiness, which in turn affects both the size of the tax base and real debt service costs. While fiscal policy, in the form of tax or government spending changes have the obvious fiscal consequences, it also influences inflation either through the labor supply response to distortionary taxation or the aggregate demand effect of changes in government spending. As a result, in our sticky-price economy, there will be resource costs resulting from the inflationary consequences of fiscal consolidations so that the ‘distortions’ governing the calculus of expansionary fiscal consolidations go beyond the usual deadweight losses of distortionary taxation.

In our model fiscal consolidations are triggered after debt rises to a level which breaches a ‘fiscal limit’. The upper bound of the fiscal limit is the maximum level of debt the government is able to support, where the government’s ability to sustain a given level of debt depends upon the nature of the tax Laffer curve it faces and the shocks it may experience, such that it is stochastic. However, it is anticipated that governments will attempt to stabilize debt through fiscal consolidations in advance of reaching this upper bound, although due to political factors such as a war of attrition over who bears the costs of a particular consolidation they may leave such a consolidation to the last minute (see the empirical evidence in Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) who find that political factors do appear to play a significant role in determining when a consolidation is instigated in a manner consistent with war of attrition type effects). Consistent with this evidence, although we do not formally model the political decision making process, the probability of a fiscal consolidation is rising in the level of government debt.

4.1 Households Our cashless economy is populated by a large number of identical households of size 1, who have preferences given by,

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t, n_t)$$

where $\beta \in (0, 1)$ is the households’ subjective discount factor, $c_t$ is consumption and $n_t$ the households’ labor supply. The household receives nominal wages $W_t$ and monopoly profits
\( \Upsilon_t \) from the firm, both of which are taxed at the rate, \( \tau_t \), and lump-sum transfers \( z_t \) from the government. The household chooses consumption, \( c_t \), hours worked, \( n_t \), and nominal bond holdings, \( B_t \), to maximize utility subject to their budget constraint,

\[
P_t c_t + \frac{B_t}{R_t} = B_{t-1} + (1 - \tau_t) (W_t n_t + P_t \Upsilon_t) + P_t z_t
\]

(25)

The budget constraint can be written as in real term as

\[
c_t + \frac{b_t}{\pi_t} = \frac{b_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + (1 - \tau_t) \left( w_t n_t + \Upsilon_t \right) + z_t
\]

where \( w_t \equiv W_t / P_t \) is the real wage. Maximizing household utility subject to the budget constraint yields the following first order conditions,

\[
\frac{1}{R_t} = \beta E_t \frac{u_c(t + 1)}{u_c(t)} \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}}
\]

(26)

\[
\frac{-u_n(t)}{u_c(t)} = w_t (1 - \tau_t)
\]

(27)

The first condition describes the household’s optimal allocation of consumption over time, and the second, their optimal labor supply decision. Notice in the case of the latter, labor income is taxed so that changes in the tax rate will influence households’ desire to work such that taxes are distortionary.

### 4.2 Final Good Production

Final goods production is for the purposes of private and public consumption and competitive final goods firms buy the differentiated products produced by intermediate goods producers in order to construct consumption aggregates, which have the usual CES form,

\[
y_t = \left( \int_0^1 y_t(i) \frac{\alpha^{-1}}{\alpha} \; di \right)^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}}
\]

(28)

where \( y_t \) is aggregate output, \( y_t(i) \) the output of intermediate good firm \( i \), and \( \theta > 1 \) is the elasticity of demand for each firm’s product. Cost minimization on the part of final goods producers results in the following demand curve for intermediate good \( i \),

\[
y_t(i) = \left( \frac{p_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} y_t
\]

(29)
and an associated price index for final goods,
\[ P_t = \left( \int_0^1 p_t(i)^{1-\theta} \, di \right)^{1\over 1-\theta} \] (30)

4.3 Intermediate Goods Production  The imperfectly competitive intermediate goods firms enjoy some monopoly power in producing a differentiated product such that they face a downward sloping demand curve, but are also subject to Rotemberg quadratic-adjustment costs such that large price changes in excess of steady-state inflation rates are particularly costly. The quadratic price adjustment costs renders the firm’s problem dynamic,
\[
\max \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} R_{0,t} \left( p_t(i) y_t(i) - mc_t y_t - \phi \left( p_t(i) \frac{1}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 P_t y_t \right) \\
\text{s.t. } y_t(i) = \left( \frac{p_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\theta} y_t
\] (31)

where \( mc_t = w_t/A_t \) is the real marginal cost implied by a linear production function, \( y_t(i) = A_t n_t(i) \). Productivity, \( A_t \) is common to all firms and follows an AR(1) process:
\[
A_t - A = \rho A(A_{t-1} - A) + \varepsilon_t^A, \quad \varepsilon_t^A \sim i.i.d. \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_A^2)
\]

The first-order condition, after imposing symmetry across firms, is,
\[
(1 - \theta) + \theta mc_t - \phi \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right) \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} + \beta \phi E_t u_c(t + 1) \left( \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} - 1 \right) \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} y_{t+1} = 0.
\]

which represents the non-linear New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) under Rotemberg pricing and which would, upon linearization, correspond to the standard NKPC under Calvo (1983) pricing.

The associated monopoly profit, which is taxed by the government when received by households, is,
\[
\Upsilon_t = y_t - mc_t Y_t - \phi \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 y_t.
\] (33)

The aggregate resource constraint is,
\[
c_t + g_t = A_t n_t \left( 1 - \phi \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 \right).
\]

4.4 Monetary and Fiscal Policy  Combining the households’ budget constraints and noting the equivalence between factor incomes and national output allows us to derive the
government budget constraint:

\[
\frac{B_t}{R_t} + \tau_t (W_t m_t + P_t Y_t) = B_{t-1} + P_t g_t + P_t z_t
\]  

(34)

where we see that while fiscal policy in the form of tax, transfers and government spending changes will obviously affect debt dynamics, monetary policy will also have a role to play, especially when debt stocks are large. The government’s budget constraint can be rewritten as:

\[
\frac{b_{t-1}}{\pi_t} = \frac{b_t}{R_t} + T_t - g_t - z_t
\]

Monetary policy: We assume that monetary policy follows a simple rule of the form,

\[
R_t - R = \alpha (\pi_t - \pi)
\]  

(35)

Fiscal policy outside of fiscal consolidations: Before considering what happens to fiscal policy variables during consolidation episodes, we describe what happens to those variables outside of consolidations. We allow fiscal transfers to depend on a regime-switching index \(rs^z_t\),

\[
z(rs^z_t) = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \rho^z)z + \rho^z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon^z_t & \text{if } rs^z_t = 1 (\rho^z < 1) \\
\zeta^z z_{t-1} + \varepsilon^z_t & \text{if } rs^z_t = 2 (\zeta^z > 1)
\end{cases}
\]

with \(\varepsilon^z_t \sim i.i.d. \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2_z)\) and \(rs^z_t\) following a transition matrix of \(\begin{pmatrix} p^z_1 & 1 - p^z_1 \\ 1 - p^z_2 & p^z_2 \end{pmatrix}\). Within the Markov regime-switching process we move from a stationary process for transfers with \(\rho^z < 1\) to one where transfers explode with \(\zeta^z > 1\). Therefore, although transfers will ultimately be stabilized, there can be prolonged periods during which transfers increase leading to sustained increases in government debt which can prompt attempts at fiscal consolidation. Such localized instability in transfers is common to many advanced economies. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate that the transfers-GDP ratios during the past 40 years are stable in some countries but not in others.

Outside of consolidations, the government spending, \(g_t\) follows an AR(1) process:

\[
g_t - g = \rho^g (g_{t-1} - g) + \varepsilon^g_t \quad \varepsilon^g_t \sim i.i.d. \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2_g)
\]  

(36)

and tax rates are adjusted to stabilize government debt,

\[
\tau_t - \tau = \gamma^\tau (b_{t-1} - b)
\]
Fiscal policy during fiscal consolidations: Fiscal consolidations are then considered in the form of non-zero values for $m^g_t$ and $m^\tau_t$, implying reductions in government spending and increases in taxation relative to the values implied by the exogenous processes for spending and the tax rule.

\begin{align}
g_t - g &= m^g_t + \rho^g(g_{t-1} - g) \\
\tau_t - \tau &= m^\tau_t + \gamma^\tau(b_{t-1} - b)
\end{align}

There are two layers of uncertainty about the fiscal consolidations: when will it occur and what form will it take? The probability of beginning a consolidation depends on the current level of government debt $b_{t-1}$ and a stochastic fiscal limit $b^*_t$. Households know the distribution of fiscal limit, but the timing of consolidations is uncertain due to the stochastic realized fiscal limit. At period $t$, if the existing government liability is lower than the realized fiscal limit, the government doesn’t take consolidations; otherwise, consolidations, either through tax increases or spending cuts, occur and last for one year, in line with the majority of consolidations observed in AA data. Whether consolidations are taken through tax or spending is random, governed by the parameter $\omega$.

\begin{align}
\begin{cases}
  \text{if } b_{t-1} < b^*_t: & \text{no FC} \\
  \text{otherwise, with prob of } \omega: & \text{tax-type FC } (m^\tau > 0) \\
  \text{with prob of } 1 - \omega: & \text{spending-type FC } (m^g > 0)
\end{cases}
\end{align}

As shown in Figure 5, a state variable $rs_t$ tracks the path of consolidations. The probability that $rs_t > 1$ such that we begin a consolidation depends on the distribution of the fiscal limit and the current level of government debt $\Phi(b_{t-1}) (\Phi' > 0)$.

5 Fiscal Limit

Laffer curves provide a natural starting point for quantifying the fiscal limit from the tax revenue side of the government’s budget constraint. At the peak of the Laffer curve tax revenues reach their maximum and, given some level of total government expenditures, the expected present value of primary surpluses and, therefore, the value of government debt, are maximized. Revenues, expenditures, and discount rates, of course, vary with the shocks hitting the economy, generating a distribution for the maximum debt-GDP level that can be supported. We refer to this as the distribution of the fiscal limit. This section describes more precisely how we derive that distribution.
5.1 Laffer Curve  
Assume the utility function is \( u(c_t, n_t) = \log c_t + \chi_N \log(1 - n_t) \). Labor supply can be solved analytically as a function of \((\tau_t, \pi_t, A_t, g_t)\) using the first-order conditions. Work effort is given by

\[
    n_t = \frac{w_t X_{1,t} + \chi_n g_t}{w_t X_{1,t} + \chi_n X_{2,t}} \quad (39)
\]

with

\[
    X_{1,t} = 1 - \tau_t \quad (40)
\]

\[
    X_{2,t} = A_t \left( 1 - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 \right) \quad (41)
\]

Total tax revenue is

\[
    T_t = \left( w_t n_t + \Upsilon_t \right) \tau_t = A_t n_t \tau_t \left( 1 - \frac{\phi}{2} \left( \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1 \right)^2 \right). \quad (42)
\]

When the monetary authority keeps the inflation rate at its target \( (\pi_t = \pi) \), the peak of the Laffer curve is a function only of the exogenous state of the economy \((A_t, g_t)\).

\[
    \tau^\text{max}_t = \tau^\text{max} (A_t, g_t) \quad (43)
\]

\[
    T^\text{max}_t = T^\text{max} (A_t, g_t) \quad (44)
\]

Evidently, the stochastic processes governing the exogenous states induce stochastic processes for both the tax rate that maximizes revenues and the level of revenues.

5.2 Distribution of the Fiscal Limit  
The fiscal limit is defined, following Bi (2011), as the maximum expected present value of future primary surpluses.

\[
    B^* = E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \beta_p \frac{u_c^{\text{max}}(A_t, g_t)}{u_c^{\text{max}}(A_0, g_0)} \left( T^{\text{max}}(A_t, g_t) - g_t - z_t \right) \quad (45)
\]

Calculation of the fiscal limit uses the stochastic discount factor that obtains when tax rates are at the peak of the Laffer curve, \( \beta^t u_c^{\text{max}}(A_t, g_t)/u_c^{\text{max}}(A_0, g_0) \), but modified to allow for a political risk parameter \( \beta_p \).

Higher political risk—lower \( \beta_p \)—lends itself to multiple interpretations that reflect the private sector’s beliefs about policy. Most straightforward is the idea that policymakers are believed to have effectively shorter planning horizons than the private sector [see, for example, Acemoglu, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008)]. To see this, rewrite the discount factor in (45) as \( (\beta_p \beta)^t/(\beta_p)^{t-1} \), so that a lower value of \( \beta_p \) reduces the present value of maximum
surpluses. An alternative interpretation is that a lower $\beta_p$ implies that private agents place probability mass on both the maximum surpluses, $s^{\text{max}}$, reflected in (45), and on surpluses being zero. Rewrite the surpluses as $\beta_p s^{\text{max}} + (1 - \beta_p) \cdot 0$ for this interpretation. Nothing we do hinges on the precise interpretation attached to $\beta_p$. As a practical matter, setting $\beta_p < 1$ serves to shift down the distribution of the fiscal limit, which generates occurrences of fiscal consolidations at lower levels of debt like those observed in data.

Since there exists a unique mapping between the exogenous state space, $(A_t, g_t)$, to $\tau^{\text{max}}_t$ and $T^{\text{max}}_t$, the unconditional distribution of the fiscal limit, $f(B^*)$, can be derived from a Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation following the steps that appendix A describes.

The choice of $b^*_t$, which we treat as random, is determined by political considerations that are driven by the policymakers’ assessments of the costs associated with implementing fiscal consolidations.

### 6 Calibration and Solution

**Calibration:** The model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency to represent the fiscal structure of a typical economy within the EU-14. We focus on such economies since they feature heavily in the AA dataset, both in terms of undertaking the sizeable fiscal consolidations considered by AA, but also since they have on occasion enjoyed consolidations labelled as ‘expansionary’ by AA. Based on the summary of fiscal structure across such economies in Trabant and Uhlig (2011), it appears that Greece, Germany and the Netherlands are similar to the EU-14 average in terms of ratios of government spending, revenues from labor income taxes and transfers to GDP. Moreover, these economies are similar to the average of the EU-14 in their proximity to the peak of the Laffer curve for labor income taxes, such that, for a given political risk factor, $\beta_p$, their fiscal limits should be similar.

Accordingly, the fiscal parameters are roughly calibrated to match Greek data from 1971 to 2007. In steady state, government purchases are 16.7% of GDP and lump-sum transfers are 13.34% of GDP. The tax rate is 0.315 at the steady state, and the resulting government debt is 35.26% of GDP at an annual rate. The tax adjustment parameter, $\gamma$, is calibrated to 0.5 at annual rate, which is roughly consistent with estimates.\(^4\)

The International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) index of political risk offers one way to calibrate the political factor, $\beta_p$ [see Arteta and Galina (2008)]. The ICRG index of political risk for Greece stayed at the level of 60 (out of 100) during the period between 1984 and 1993, and then rose above the level of 80 between 1994 and 1996 before coming down in the recent financial crisis. We calibrate $\beta_p$ to the pre-EMU ICRG level in Greece.

\(^4\)Linear regression of the tax rate on the government debt-GDP ratio from 1971 to 1995 is 0.42, while the debt-GDP ratio is almost flat from 1995 to 2007.
For the countries with unstable transfers, shown in Figure 2, the transfer growth varies from 1.2% in Italy to 3.2% in Japan at annual rate. $\zeta$ is calibrated to the transfer growth in Greece since 1970, 2.6% at annual rate. The regime-switching parameters $p_1^z$ and $p_2^z$ are calibrated to 0.95, implying that the average length of each regime is 5 years. A higher $p^z$ leads to a more dispersed distribution of fiscal limits.

The household discount rate is 0.99 and the net real interest rate is 4.04 percent at annual rate. The utility function is assumed to be $u(c, L) = \log c + \chi_n \log(1 - n)$. The leisure preference parameter, $\chi_n$, is calibrated in such a way that the household spends 25 percent of its time working and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 3. Time endowment and the productivity level at the steady state are normalized to 1.

Table 2 summarizes the calibration. Parameterizations of the shock processes for $A_t$ and $g_t$ follow the literature. The price elasticity of demand, $\theta$, is assumed to be 11 and the Rotemberg adjustment parameter, $\phi$, is 100, which is equivalent to Calvo-type overlapping contracts models where 26.7 percent of the firms reoptimize each quarter [see Keen and Wang (2007)]. The gross inflation rate is calibrated to 1.03 at annual rate and the Taylor rule parameter is assumed to be 1.5.

Under the calibration in table 2, the simulated distribution of the fiscal limit is shown in the top plot of Figure 1, with the middle plot being the estimated distribution. The fat tail is generated by the possible explosive transfers. If the political risk factor, $\beta_p$ were constant and equal to unity, the distribution of the fiscal limit would be centered at about 300 percent of GDP. Since, as discussed in the Introduction, many economies are contemplating sizeable fiscal consolidations at debt to GDP ratios well short of 300% and AA observe significant fiscal consolidations in the data at relatively low debt-gdp ratios we feel it is reasonable to scale the fiscal limit in this way.

As discussed in section 2, the length of consolidations $h$ in our model is calibrated to one year, while the size of consolidations $m^\tau$ and $m^g$ are calibrated to 1% of the steady-state level of GDP.6

**Solution:** We solve the full non-linear model laid out in section 4, coupled with the fiscal limit described in section 5, using the monotone map method, which discretizes the state space and finds fixed points in the space of decision rules.

The solution method, based on Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004), conjectures candidate decision rules that reduce the system to a set of expectation first-order difference equations.

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5For instance, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) assume $\rho_A$ to be 0.8556, $\sigma_A$ to be 0.0064, $\rho_g$ to be 0.87, and $\sigma_g$ to be 0.016$g$.

6Calibrating $m^\tau$ and $m^g$ to exactly match AA data doesn’t change the main results, but may complicate identifying the relative efficiency of the different types of fiscal consolidation if they have a different scale.
In this model, the decision rule maps the state at period $t$ into the stock of government debt, the real wage, and the inflation rate in the same period. Given the state denoted as $\psi_t = \{b_{t-1}, g_t, \pi_t, \tau_t, rs_t, rs^*_t\}$, the mappings can be written as $b_t = f^b(\psi_t), w_t = f^w(\psi_t), \pi_t = f^\pi(\psi_t)$. After finding the decision rules, we can solve the pricing rule ($q_t = f^q(\psi_t)$) using the government budget constraint. The interest rate on government bonds can also be solved using $R_t = 1/q_t$, denoted as $f^R(\psi_t)$. Appendix B describes the nonlinear method in details.

7 Fiscal consolidation with only time uncertainty

As described in section 2, fiscal consolidations can occur across a wide range of debt/gdp ratios, but we anticipate that the probability of observing a fiscal consolidation is rising in the debt/gdp ratio. Therefore, consolidations at low debt levels are more likely to be something of a surprise, than the consolidations that follow sustained increases in debt. We also know from the AA data that large scale fiscal consolidations typically last for one year. Accordingly, expectations over both the likelihood of a consolidation and its duration may affect the impact of a given consolidation.

We begin by exploring the importance of uncertainty over the timing and duration of fiscal consolidations. Tax-type FC ($RS^\tau$) and spending-type FC ($RS^g$) are specified as,

$$RS^\tau : \tau_t - \tau = m^\tau(rs_t) + \gamma(b_{t-1} - b) \tag{46}$$

$$RS^g : g_t - g = -m^g(rs_t) \tag{47}$$

As illustrated in Figure 4, the fiscal consolidation measurements, $m^\tau$ and $m^g$, depend on the state-dependent variable $rs_t$, which in turn hinges on the government liability $b_{t-1}$ and the stochastic fiscal limit $b^*_t$.

$$\begin{cases} 
\text{if } rs_t = 1: & \text{No FC, } m^\tau_t = 0, m^g_t = 0 \\
\text{if } h + 1 \geq rs_t \geq 1 & \text{either } RS^\tau \text{ or } RS^g \text{ FC}
\end{cases}$$

We therefore contrast the impact of a fiscal contraction which raises tax revenues or cuts government spending by 1% of GDP for one year, when economic agents anticipate that the consolidation will be sustained for one year relative to the case where we observe the same consolidation but as a result of a series of unanticipated iid shocks. The latter case, denoted as no-RS model, is specified as following,

$$\begin{align*}
\tau_t - \tau &= \gamma(b_{t-1} - b) + \varepsilon^\tau_t \\
\tau_t - \tau &= \varepsilon^g_t
\end{align*}$$

\footnote{Given our primary interest is in the fiscal consolidations, the productivity is kept at its steady state level to speed up the code.}
7.1 Tax-type fiscal consolidation

Impulse responses when the initial debt is low (40% of GDP): Figure 10 compares the impulse responses from the no-RS and RS\(^\tau\) models when the initial level of debt is low, namely 40% of annualized GDP. In the case of the RS\(^\tau\) model the tax based fiscal consolidation is known to last for four quarters should it occur. While in the no-RS variant of the model there is no expectation that the fiscal consolidation will continue, although to illustrate the properties of the model we assume that iid tax shocks are drawn which happen to mimic the duration of the RS\(^\tau\) consolidation.

In Figure 10 the probability of consolidation is the level of the variable, while all other variables compute the difference in the outcome under a fiscal consolidation relative to the outcome without consolidation, although economic agents will form rational expectations as to whether or not a consolidation will occur in the future in both cases.

At such low levels of debt the probability of fiscal consolidation is very low, such that the observed consolidation comes as a surprise in both cases and does little to affect expectations of further consolidations in the future. In the RS\(^\tau\) case, once the fiscal consolidation begins economic agents know that taxes will remain high for four quarters. This discourages labor supply and raises real wages and therefore marginal costs. Sticky-price firms raise prices in anticipation of this sustained rise in marginal costs and inflation jumps up and gradually declines over the course of the consolidation. While the initial jump helps deflate the real value of government debt, the active monetary policy in a sticky-price environment raises real interest rates in response to the rise in inflation offsetting some of the debt reduction arising from the fiscal consolidation.

When the fiscal consolidation is only expected to last one period, but actually lasts for four, price-setters are repeatedly surprised by the sustained increase in marginal costs and inflation does not rise by as much. As a result, the active monetary policy does not raise real interest rates by as much and the repeated surprise inflation places a wedge between ex ante and ex post real interest rates such that the fiscal consolidation under the iid tax shocks is more effective in stabilizing debt, which suggests that any uncertainty over the duration of fiscal consolidations may affect their likelihood of success although in a positive way in this particular experiment.

Impulse responses when the initial debt is high (170% of GDP): In Figure 11, we also consider the marginal impact of a fiscal consolidation in a sticky-price economy but where the debt to gdp ratio is 170%, making the probability of fiscal consolidation very high. Since the consolidation was already expected, inflation is already high and consumption and
labor supply are already low with the deleterious consequences on debt service costs caused by an active monetary policy. Moreover, in the base where a consolidation is expected, but has not yet arrived, the negative inflation surprises this generates will further exacerbate negative debt dynamics. As a result when the fiscal consolidation is realized, its relative impact is not as great as it would have been if the consolidation had been unanticipated. However, the marginal impact on debt is now reversed - removing the uncertainty over the duration of the fiscal consolidation removes the large negative inflation surprises found in the no consolidation base case and, since these surprises were acting on a very large stock of debt, facilitates the stabilization of debt. This reverses the results when debt levels were low and the consolidation unexpected, and highlights the importance of expectations over the likelihood and duration of fiscal consolidations.

**Inflation dynamics in RS$^\tau$ model:** In order to understand the inflation dynamics and the nature of the surprises induced by fiscal consolidations, we plot the *level* of inflation and expected inflation in Figures 12 and 13 when the initial debt is low or high.

In Figure 12 the top panel compares the inflation rate $\pi_t$ and the one-step ahead expected inflation $E_{t-1}\pi_t$ when the debt goes up to a low level (40% of GDP) at $t=5$ but no fiscal consolidation ever occurs. Following the debt shock, given the fiscal rule, tax rates rise with it, raising marginal costs and fuelling inflation. As the debt is successfully stabilized over time, tax rates fall and inflation returns to its steady-state value. The bottom panel adds two more paths: $\pi_t$ and $E_{t-1}\pi_t$ when a fiscal consolidation occurs at $t=9$. Here when the consolidation is realized, the tax rate rises, labor supply contracts and consumption falls. This increase in marginal costs further fuels inflation and since the consolidation was unexpected, there is an inflation surprise in the first period of the consolidation.

The dynamics are quite different if the initial debt level is high (170% of GDP at $t=5$), shown in Figure 13. The top panel compares actual inflation, $\pi_t$ and expected inflation, $E_{t-1}\pi_t$ when no fiscal consolidation ever occurs. When the debt shock occurs, tax rates rise in line with the fiscal rule and, given debt levels are so high, economic agents are anticipating a consolidation (although no actual consolidation takes place). Since a fiscal consolidation is associated with higher inflation, inflationary expectations rise significantly following the debt shock. However when this consolidation doesn’t occur, taxes are not as high as expected and there is a negative inflation shock. When a consolidation actually does occur at $t=9$ in the lower panel, taxes rise and this increases inflation turning the negative inflation surprise positive. It is also worth pointing out that upon exiting the fiscal consolidation economic agents know that there will no further fiscal consolidation for at least one period. As a result there are no suprises either during or in the period immediately following the consolidation,
while in all other periods there is a non-zero probability attached to consolidation which implies an inflation surprise no matter whether a consolidation is realized or not, although the sign of that shock varies depending on whether or not a consolidation begins.

**Output multiplier:** Figure 14 shows the output multiplier, which is defined as

$$\Gamma_{t+k}^y = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^k \left( \prod_{i=0}^j r_{t+i}^{-1} \right) (y_{t+j}^{\text{shock}} - y_{t+j}^{\text{no}})}{\sum_{j=0}^k \left( \prod_{i=0}^j r_{t+i}^{-1} \right) \tau_{t+j}^{\text{shock}} y}$$

(48)

In other words it measures the discounted percentage change in cumulative output for one discounted unit of fiscal consolidation. It confirms that at low debt levels the tax-based fiscal consolidation of known duration ($RS^*$) is less expansionary than an equivalent fiscal consolidation of unanticipated iid tax increases, but these relative rankings are reversed at higher debt levels. This reflects the fact that in the base case for the high debt levels, price-setting behavior is already factoring in the probability of a sustained fiscal consolidation which raises inflation, debt service costs and has a negative impact on debt dynamics. The relative size of the fiscal multipliers captures this effect of expectations on the no consolidation base case.

### 7.2 Spending-type fiscal consolidation

We now turn to consider the outcomes under government-spending based consolidations, where again these maybe of uncertain duration. We explore their impact in low and high debt environments.

**Impulse responses when the initial debt is low (40% of GDP):** Figure 17 compares the impulse responses from no-RS and $RS^g$ models when the initial level of debt is low, where again spending based consolidations are iid in nature in the no-RS case, but are known to last for one year in the $RS^g$ case. The assumption of sticky prices enables monetary policy to have real effects. It also implies that price setters will attempt to anticipate future fiscal consolidations. As a result, when a consolidation begins and price-setters anticipate it will last for a year, inflation falls immediately and then slowly returns to normal as the period of low government spending passes. Under the active monetary policy, this reduction in inflation, results in lower real interest rates which help reduce debt service costs and maintain the size of the tax base. In contrast, when the expected duration of the consolidation was only one period, price-setters fail to anticipate the subsequent decreases in government spending such that inflation doesn’t fall by as much on impact.

As a result, the uncertainty over the duration of the consolidation serves to reduce its deflationary consequences which reduces the offsetting monetary policy response. This is
also in contrast to the tax-based consolidations considered above, where uncertainty over the duration of the consolidation was less inflationary and so raised debt service costs by less.

**Impulse responses when the initial debt is high (170% of GDP):** In Figure 18, we contrast the two types of government spending consolidation, but where the initial debt stock is very large, namely 170% of annualized GDP. In this case economic agents are anticipating that government spending cuts are imminent. Moreover, the base case now contains positive inflation surprises as consolidations are expected but not realized. However, the outcomes are quite similar to those under lower debt levels. The noticeable differences are that there is a smaller relative increase in consumption when the consolidation is realized as households were already expecting government spending to be cut at any moment due to the high level of the debt stock. Similarly, the initial deflation is smaller as it was already factored into inflationary expectations, and the spike in inflationary expectations as the end of the consolidation period reflects the fact that in the base economic agents are expectation a deflationary consolidation even although none has occurred, while in the period following a realized consolidation they know that no consolidation will take place.

7.3 **Key message of time uncertainty:** To sum up, Figure 19 compares the output multipliers for no-RS, $RS^\tau$ and $RS^g$ models with sticky prices. The multiplier under a expenditure based fiscal consolidation/shock is defined as,

$$\text{Multiplier } \Gamma_{t+k}^y = \frac{\sum_{j=0}^{k} \left( \prod_{i=0}^{j} r_{t+i}^{-1} \right) (y_{t+j}^{\text{shock}} - y_{t+j}^{no})}{\sum_{j=0}^{k} \left( \prod_{i=0}^{j} r_{t+i}^{-1} \right) (-g_{t+j}^{\text{shock}})}$$

(49)

We can see that with a low initial debt level, the tax and government spending consolidations, which are not expected to last, provide upper and lower bounds, respectively, for the same consolidations of known duration. This is for the reasons discussed above: not anticipating the duration of the consolidation limits the inflationary (deflationary) response to the tax (spending)-based fiscal consolidation which, in turn, affects the extent to which monetary policy raises (reduces) real interest rates during the consolidation. In contrast, at high initial debt levels, tax based consolidations of known duration outperform those of uncertain duration, while government spending-based consolidations performs in a similar way regardless of the extent to which the duration of the consolidation is uncertain. The expansionary effect from $RS^\tau$ is due to the fact that the tax increase today can reduce the need for future tax increases, either through the fiscal rule or subsequent fiscal consolida-
tions, which would otherwise have negative effects on current debt service costs and tax base due to expectations effects.

8 Fiscal consolidation with time and composition uncertainty

Now we consider the time and composition uncertainty jointly: in the RS model,

\[
\begin{align*}
\tau_t - \tau &= m^\tau (rs_t) + \gamma (b_{t-1} - b) \\
g_t - g &= -m^g (rs_t)
\end{align*}
\]

As illustrated in Figure 5, the fiscal consolidation measurements depend on the state-dependent variable \(rs_t\), which in turn hinges on the government liability \(b_{t-1}\) and the stochastic fiscal limit \(b^*_t\).

\[
\begin{cases}
\text{if } b_{t-1} < b^*_t: & \text{no FC } (m^\tau_t = 0, m^g = 0) \\
\text{otherwise, with prob of } \omega: & \tau-\text{type FC } (m^\tau_t = m^\tau, m^g_t = 0) \\
\text{with prob of } 1 - \omega: & g-\text{type FC } (m^\tau_t = 0, m^g_t = m^g)
\end{cases}
\]

The parameterization is as follows: \(m^\tau = 0.01, m^g = 0.01y\), which implies that the magnitude of the tax and government spending based consolidations amount to 1% of GDP. As noted above we also calibrate the probability that the consolidation is tax based to be \(\omega = 0.75\) which is in line with the AA data. However, we explore how variations in this probability can influence the impact of alternative types of consolidation.

8.1 Benchmark case: \(\alpha = 1.5\) and \(\omega = 0.75\) We first calibrate \(\omega\) to the data, implying the probability of having a tax-based (\(\tau\)-type) fiscal consolidation is three-times as high as a government expenditure (\(g\)-type) fiscal consolidation.

Impulse responses when the initial debt is low (40% of GDP): Figure 20 compares the impulse responses for \(\tau\)-type vs. \(g\)-type FC when the initial debt to gdp ratio is low. When debt levels are this low there is little expectation of there being a fiscal consolidation in the near future, and, as a result there are little expectations effects, beyond the fact that when a consolidation is actually initiated economic agents know it will last for one year. Accordingly, at low levels of debt, if the fiscal consolidation turns out to be of the tax-based kind, then the impulse responses are very similar to those observed when tax-based consolidations are the only possible kind of consolidation as in Figure 10. Similarly, when the fiscal consolidation is essentially unexpected, if the realized fiscal consolidation happens to be based on government spending cuts, then the impulse responses are very similar to the
outcomes of fiscal consolidations where the only kind of consolidation is of the government spending type, Figure 17. In other words when debt levels are low, economic agents do not expect there to be a consolidation of any kind, such that uncertainty of which type of consolidation would emerge upon realization of such an unlikely event is not important.

**Impulse responses when the initial debt is high (170% of GDP):** In Figure 21, we have very high levels of debt such that economic agents believe that a fiscal consolidation is imminent. In such an environment uncertainty over which type of consolidation will be realized starts to matter. Given that economic agents expect consolidations to involve tax increases 75% of the time, their expectations are that there will be inflationary increases in distortionary taxation when the consolidation begins. Accordingly, if there is actually a government spending based consolidation this is something of a surprise, which reduces inflation relative to the no-consolidation base (which incorporates expectations of predominately tax-based consolidations even although they are not actually realized in the base.) The deflationary government spending-based consolidation then, via the active monetary policy rule, reduces real interest rates, which helps support the tax base and reduce debt service costs. Moreover, the consumption gain from realizing the government spending consolidation, when households were worried that the consolidation would be tax-based, is significantly higher. As a result, relative to the no-consolidation base case, real wages actually rise when the government spending consolidation is realized while they would have fallen if there was no composition uncertainty and all consolidations were spending-based.

When the realized consolidations are of the tax-based type, then since these were largely anticipated, the results are qualitatively similar to those seen when all consolidations are tax-based without any composition uncertainty. Therefore, we see that the higher distortionary tax rates observed during the fiscal consolidation, raise marginal costs which fuels inflation during the course of the consolidation. The active monetary policy then responds to this higher inflation by raising real interest rates, which diminishes the tax base and raises debt service costs. This accounts for the relatively poor performance of the tax-based consolidations in stabilizing debt when debt levels are high, even although both tax and spending based consolidations have roughly the same impact on the primary deficit and are equally effective at stabilizing debt when debt levels are relatively low.

This intuition is consistent with the decision rules plotted in Figure 22.

**Output multiplier:** Figure 23 compares the output multiplier under $\tau$—type and $g$—type consolidations when the type of consolidation is uncertain, and tax increase and spending cuts in no-RS model where there is no composition uncertainty. At low levels of debt, the
two types of fiscal consolidation (tax and spending) applied without composition uncertainty, provide upper and lower bounds for the regime-switching model, similar to the comparison with only time uncertainty in Figure 19. When debt levels are higher, $g$–type fiscal consolidations in the regime-switching model with composition uncertainty can outperform the same consolidations when they are applied with certainty by a substantial margin, while $\tau$–type fiscal consolidation in the model with composition uncertainty is very similar to tax increases applied in the absence of composition uncertainty. This is due to the expectation spill-over effect, as explained in the simple example above. When economic agents are expecting the consolidation to be tax based and fear that just such a consolidation is imminent, they are relieved to find that the consolidation effort is government spending based. While this does not lead to an immediate increase in output while the government spending cuts are being implemented, it does significantly reduce their short-run costs and raise the medium to longer term benefits.

If there was never any fear of a consolidation being tax based these expectational effects would not apply and the discounted output multiplier from a spending based consolidation would always be negative. In contrast when the realized consolidation is tax based, but there was the possibility that it could be spending based, the output costs of the consolidation are deepened. As we shall now see, this ranking could be different depending on the monetary policy stance ($\alpha$) and economic agents’ expectations about the likely composition of any fiscal consolidation, $\omega$.

### 8.2 Discussion of MP stance and household’s expectation of FC

**Less active MP:** The discussion of the relative efficacy of tax and government spending based consolidations when debt levels are high highlighted the importance of the repercussions on debt service costs of the monetary policy response to the consolidation. Accordingly, deflationary government spending cuts facilitate a relaxation of monetary policy which helps stabilize debt through its impact on the tax base and debt service costs in a sticky price economy. In contrast, when monetary policy responds to the higher inflation generated by distortionary tax based consolidations, this has the opposite effect of raising the interest rates payable on government debt, which is particularly destabilizing when debt levels are large. This would tend to suggest that the responsiveness of monetary policy to inflation is a key ingredient in defining the relative efficacy of the alternative types of fiscal consolidation. To explore this, for high debt levels of 170% of gdp, Figure 24 shows the impulse responses across the two types of fiscal consolidation where monetary policy is less active ($\alpha = 1.2$) relative to the benchmark of $\alpha = 1.5$ considered in Figure 21, such that nominal interest
rates only rise by 1.2 percentage point for every 1 percentage point rise in inflation above target, rather than the more aggressive response of 1.5 percentage points.

Contrasting the two figures, we can see that reducing the responsiveness of interest rates to excess inflation deepens the recession under government-spending based consolidations, and reduces its ability to stabilize debt. While, tax based consolidations are not thwarted by monetary policy to the same extent, such that there is a more pronounced decline in debt following the tax based consolidation when monetary policy is less active. Nevertheless, it remains the case that government spending based consolidations are relatively more effective in reducing the debt burden, and this relative efficacy at high debt levels is likely to exist as long as monetary policy is active.

Figure 25 compares the output multiplier under $\tau-$type and $g-$type of RS model, and tax increase and spending cut in no-RS model. Compared to the calibration with $\alpha = 1.5$, under the less active monetary policy, tax increases can be more expansionary (the output multiplier turns to positive upon the exit of fiscal consolidation), while the spending cut becomes much more contractionary. This has implications for those economies attempting consolidations in an environment when nominal interest rates are close to, or at, the zero lower bound. In such an environment we are far less likely to observe an expansionary consolidation due to the consolidation unexpectedly being based on a cut in government spending rather than an expected tax cut.

**Lower probability of tax increases:** In our final experiment we return to our benchmark monetary policy of $\alpha = 1.5$, but reverse the relative likelihood of tax and government spending based consolidations by setting $\omega = 0.25$, such that the probability of spending cuts is three-times as high as that of tax increases - see Figure 26. As before, at low debt levels this reversal makes negligible difference since no consolidations of either kind are expected. However, if we consider high debt levels then fiscal consolidations are thought to be imminent and it matters which type of consolidation economic agents anticipate will occur. When we reverse the relative probabilities of tax and government spending-based consolidations, then economic agents believe the consolidations will lead to deflationary cuts in government spending. Accordingly, when the relatively low probability tax-based consolidation is realized inflation rises relative to base, monetary policy responds by raising real interest rates, reducing the size of the tax base when prices are sticky and fueling debt service costs. This is actually enough to imply that government debt rises relative to the no-consolidation base case.

The government spending-based consolidations are still relatively effective in stabilizing debt, but the benefits of economic agents finding that the consolidation was not of the
expected tax-based kind are not so apparent when they attach a smaller probability weight to tax-based consolidations. Effectively when debt levels are high, the no consolidation base case contains surprises since economic agents are expecting fiscal consolidations to occur, when they don’t. When these consolidations are expected to be tax based, they raise inflationary expectations which fuel current inflation in a sticky price economy. In the presence of an active monetary policy the monetary policy response to high inflation will both contract the economy (and thereby the tax base) and raise debt service costs. In contrast, when fiscal consolidations are likely to involve substantial government spending cuts, which are deflationary, this reduces inflationary expectations which results in price setters moderating their price increases, facilitating a relaxation in monetary policy. Accordingly, there is a clear incentive for governments to clarify that any fiscal consolidations that emerge are likely to expenditure based since this will help moderate the destabilizing implications of the inflationary consequences of tax-based consolidations.

Figure 27 compares the output multiplier under tax and expenditure based consolidations, when there is uncertainty as to which will be realized ($\tau$–type and $g$–type regime switching consolidations), and tax increase and spending cut consolidations in the absence of any composition uncertainty. In line with the impulse responses reported above, if the household puts a higher probability weight on spending cuts as the likely form of consolidations, tax-based consolidations can be much more contractionary as economic agents are particularly disappointed to observe that the consolidation is tax based. While the benefits of discovering that a realized consolidation is spending based are correspondingly reduced since it was expected that consolidations were more likely to be of that form.

9 Summary

In this paper we have explored the non-linearities inherent in state-dependent fiscal consolidations, where the exact timing of these consolidations is uncertain, but the likelihood of observing a consolidation is rising as debt levels rise. Moreover, consistent with the different types of fiscal consolidation observed in the data, we have contrasted fiscal consolidations which raise taxes to stabilize government debt, with those which opt to cut government expenditure. These have been examined in a variety of contexts, including low and high debt levels, different degrees of monetary policy activism and different beliefs about the relative probability that any future consolidations will be tax or expenditure based. Our results show that there are significant interactions between all these factors in determining the marginal impact of a given fiscal consolidation.

For example, at low debt levels, tax or expenditure based consolidations, of the same
magnitude in terms of their effect on the primary budget, are almost equally successful in stabilizing debt. However, at higher debt levels when economic agents start to expect fiscal consolidations to occur, expectational effects can have significant impacts on the relative efficacy of alternative types of fiscal consolidation. Cuts in government spending are particularly helpful in stabilizing government debt as their deflationary impact on aggregate demand allows for a relaxation in monetary policy which has particularly beneficial effects on debt dynamics when debt levels are high. In contrast, tax based consolidations which raise distortionary taxes during the consolidation episode, discourage labor supply, raise marginal costs and fuel inflation. This in turn prompts a monetary policy response from an inflation targeting central bank which is damaging for debt dynamics. The relative magnitude of these affects depends on the extent of price-stickiness, the strength of the monetary policy response to excess inflation and the extent to which economic agents were expecting the consolidation to be of one type or another. While some of these factors are considered in the empirical literature on fiscal consolidations, particularly the notion that expenditure based consolidations are more likely to be associated with ‘successful’ consolidations, our analysis suggests that the non-linearities inherent in the interactions between these elements make empirical identification of these effects through standard regression analysis difficult.
REFERENCES


A Simulating the Fiscal Limit

The fiscal limit \( B^* \) can be obtained using Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation:

1. First, for each simulation, we randomly draw the shocks of productivity, government purchases, and transfers for 1500 periods. Assuming that the tax rate is always at the peak of the dynamic Laffer curves, we compute the paths of all other variables using the household first-order conditions and the budget constraints. According to equation 45, we compute the discounted sum of maximum fiscal surplus by discarding the first 500 draws as a burn-in period.

2. Second, we repeat the simulation for 100,000 times and obtain the distribution of the fiscal limit, which is then approximated through kernel density estimation.

3. At each period of time, the effective fiscal limit \( b_t^* \) is a random draw from the distribution.

B Solving the Nonlinear Model

The decision rules for government debt \( b_t = f^{b}(\psi_t) \), real wage \( w_t = f^{w}(\psi_t) \) and inflation rate \( \pi_t = f^{\pi}(\psi_t) \), are solved in the following steps:

1. Discretize the state space \( \psi_t = \{b_{t-1}, g_t, z_t, \tau_t, rs_t, rs^z_t\} \) with grid points of \( n_b = 25, n_g = 5, n_z = 5, n_\tau = 11, n_{rs} = 5, n_{rsz} = 2 \). Make an initial guess of the decision rules \((f_0^b, f_0^w, f_0^\pi)\) over the state space.

2. At each grid point, solve the model and obtain the updated rule \((f_i^b, f_i^w, f_i^\pi)\) using the given rule \((f_{i-1}^b, f_{i-1}^w, f_{i-1}^\pi)\). Other than the monetary and fiscal policy rules, the optimization equations can be summarized,

\[
\frac{1}{R_t} = \beta E_t \frac{u_c(t+1)}{u_c(t)} \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}} \quad (B.1)
\]
\[
- \frac{u_n(t)}{u_c(t)} = w_t (1 - \tau_t) \quad (B.2)
\]
\[
c_t + \frac{b_t}{R_t} = \frac{b_{t-1}}{\pi_t} + (1 - \tau_t) (w_t n_t + \Upsilon_t) + z_t \quad (B.3)
\]
\[
c_t + g_t = A_t n_t \left(1 - \frac{\phi}{2} \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1\right)^2\right) \quad (B.4)
\]
\[
(1 - \theta) + \theta m c_t = \phi \left(\frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - 1\right) \frac{\pi_t}{\pi} - \beta \phi E_t \frac{u_c(t+1)}{u_c(t)} \left(\frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} - 1\right) \frac{\pi_{t+1}}{\pi} \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} \quad (B.5)
\]

The integrals in the right-hand side are evaluated using Gauss-Hermite quadratures.
3. Check convergence of the decision rules. If $|f^b_i - f^b_{i-1}|$ or $|f^w_i - f^w_{i-1}|$ or $|f^\pi_i - f^\pi_{i-1}|$ is above the desired tolerance (set to $1e-6$), go back to step 2; otherwise, $f^b_i$, $f^w_i$ and $f^\pi_i$ are the decision rules.
Figure 1: Distribution of Fiscal Limits
Figure 2: Transfer-GDP Ratios: Unstable Group

Figure 3: Transfer-GDP Ratios: Stable Group
Figure 4: Time Uncertainty

Figure 5: Composition Uncertainty
Figure 6: Impulse Response: no – RS vs. RS model with flexible price under low initial debt level

Figure 7: Impulse Response: no – RS vs. RS model with flexible price under high initial debt level
Figure 8: Inflation dynamics in the $RS^T$ model with flexible price under lower initial debt level

Figure 9: Inflation dynamics in the $RS^T$ model with flexible price under high initial debt level
Figure 10: Impulse Response: noRS vs. $RS^\tau$ model with sticky price under low initial debt level

Figure 11: Impulse Response: noRS vs. $RS^\tau$ model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Inflation and Expected Inflation

Figure 12: Inflation dynamics in the $RS^\tau$ model with sticky price under lower initial debt level

Inflation and Expected Inflation

Figure 13: Inflation dynamics in the $RS^\tau$ model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Figure 14: Output Multiplier: noRS vs. $RS^τ$ model with sticky price
Figure 15: Impulse Response: noRS vs. RS\textsuperscript{g} model with flexible price under low initial debt level

Figure 16: Impulse Response: noRS vs. RS\textsuperscript{g} model with flexible price under high initial debt level
Figure 17: Impulse Response: noRS vs. $RS^g$ model with sticky price under low initial debt level

Figure 18: Impulse Response: noRS vs. $RS^g$ model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Figure 19: Output Multiplier: noRS vs. $RS^T$ vs. $RS^g$ model with sticky price
Figure 20: Impulse Response: RS model with sticky price under low initial debt level

Figure 21: Impulse Response: RS model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Figure 22: Decision rules: $RS$ vs. $RS^r$ vs. $RS^g$ model with sticky price
Figure 23: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. RS model with sticky price
Figure 24: Impulse Response under less active MP: RS model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Figure 25: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. $RS$ model (with less active MP) with sticky price
Figure 26: Impulse Response under $\omega = 0.25$: RS model with sticky price under high initial debt level
Figure 27: Output Multiplier: no-RS vs. RS model (with $\omega = 0.25$) with sticky price
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Table 1: Expansionary and Contractionary Fiscal Adjustments (Size and Composition): * denotes statistical significance at the 5% level, all variables are the average changes in the variable relative to GDP in the two years preceding and following a fiscal consolidation and the standard errors are in brackets.
<table>
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Table 2: Model Calibration