



Are the Debt Capacity Effects of Foreign Currency Hedging Real or Illusionary? by Ephraim Clark and Amrit Judge

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Introduction

- **Many reasons for firms to hedge**
 - Taxes
 - Direct: tax function convexity
 - Indirect: increasing debt capacity (hedging lowers cash flow volatility)
 - **Pecking – order financing (increasing marginal cost of outside finance) and underinvestment risk**
 - **Managerial risk aversion**
 - **Information asymmetries**
- **When asked, firms respond that limiting variability of cash-flows is indeed important goal of risk management (Friberg & Wilander 2008)**
 - **But that could be for any/all reasons above...**

This paper

- **Does foreign currency (FC) hedging lead to increased debt capacity?**
 - This paper: Disentangle effects of FC hedging on debt capacity
 - Argues that evidence up until now may be misleading
 1. FC hedgers may be interest rate (IR) hedgers
 2. Firms can, instead of using derivatives, borrow in foreign currency to hedge FC risk – do not classify these firms as non-hedgers!
 3. Firms with FC debt could have higher leverage due to access advantages and not because of hedging
 4. **Not mentioned:** Reversed causality – do firms hedge to increase their debt capacity or does high leverage increase the need for hedging
- **The authors show that FC hedging effects on leverage come from use of FC debt**

Comments/feedback to authors

- **Define debt capacity, and relate it to your measure**
 - Firms may not leverage up to its debt capacity → Measurement error in dependent variable?
- **Section 2.2: Firms are categorized based on qualitative disclosures**
 - Do firms have to report hedging for FC, IR or commodity?
 - If not, potential misclassification problem (firms may be a hedger even if it does not report it)?
- **Section 2.3: Nice to see the actual significance levels for t-tests for difference of means between FC derivative hedgers only and non-hedgers**
 - At what level of significance do we fail to reject the null?

Comments/feedback to authors

- **Section 3**

- **Somewhat unclear methodology: Is this in principle IV - 2SLS (with a probit estimation as a first stage regression)?**
 - If it is 2SLS, we obviously need to select instruments for the first stage regression that are (preferably highly) correlated with FC hedging, but not correlated with leverage (except through the effect on hedging)
 - It would be interesting to see the list of instruments
 - First-stage regression results should in this case be presented in an appendix so we can judge the quality of instruments (strength, endogeneity tests etc.)
 - If this is something else than 2SLS – explain what
- **Error term in second stage regression:** states “corrected standard errors” in regression tables
 - Does this refer to taking into account sampling variation from stage 1?
 - Something else? Could be more specific regarding assumptions here