

Monetary Policy Spillovers and the Trilemma in the New Normal

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**“Spillovers of conventional and unconventional
monetary policy: the role of
real and financial linkages”**

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Global Financial Cycles?

- Countries around the globe anxiously await developments in major economies (the U.S., Euro Area, Japan, China)
- Small open economies are particularly sensitive to policy changes in the economic centers (CEs)
 - “Fragile five”
 - “Taper tantrum”
 - Expected lifting of ZIRP by the U.S.


The debate begins


Hélène Rey @ Jackson Hole, 2013:

“Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence”

- “Whenever capital is freely mobile, the global financial cycle constrains national monetary policies *regardless of the exchange rate regime.*”
- It is a dilemma between capital mobility and monetary policy independence, not trilemma

The Trilemma






Rey (2013)


- The CE's monetary policy influences other countries' national MPs through K-flows, credit growth, and bank leverages
- The “trilemma” reduces to an “***irreconcilable duo***” of monetary independence and K mobility
 - The types of exchange rate regime of the non-CEs no longer matter
 - Restricting K-mobility is the only way for non-central countries to retain monetary autonomy

36 month
Rolling
correlations


ST-Interest Rates



LT-Interest Rates



Stock Market Price Indexes



The Bottom Line ...

- The extent of sensitivity to core economies' conditions differs across policy regimes and economies w/ different structures
- We investigate:
 - How the sensitivity to the core economies' conditions differs across countries and change over time for different types of financial variables
 - What factors determine the extent to which the financial conditions of the center economies (i.e., the U.S., Japan, the Eurozone, and China) affect those of developing countries and EMEs

Two-Step Approach to Measuring Impact

Step 1: Estimate sensitivities

$$R_{it}^F = \alpha_{Fit} + \sum_{g=1}^G \beta_{Fit}^G Z_{it}^G + \sum_{c=1}^C \gamma_{Fit}^C X_{it}^C + \phi_{Fit} Y_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

Step 2: Relate sensitivities to macro variables

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{\gamma}_{Fit}^C = & \theta_0 + \theta_1 OMP_{Fit} + \theta_2 MC_{Fit} + \theta_3 LINK_{Fit} \\ & + \theta_4 INST_{Fit} + \theta_5 CRISIS_{Fit} + u_{Fit}. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Step 1 – estimate γ 's

$$R_{it}^F = \alpha_{Fit} + \sum_{g=1}^G \beta_{Fit}^G Z_{it}^G + \sum_{c=1}^C \gamma_{Fit}^C X_{it}^C + \phi_{Fit} Y_{it} + \varepsilon_{it}. \quad (1)$$

- R^F : a return in local country
 - Policy ST interest rates, sovereign bond term spread, changes in stock market price indexes, and changes in the REER
- X^c : a vector of corresponding returns of the “center economies”
- Z^G : global factors
 - **Real**: PC of the U.S., ECB, and BOJ policy rates, oil, commodity
 - **Financial**: VIX, Ted-spread
- Y : local factor (y/y IP growth)
- Rolling estimation w/ 36-month windows, each of 100 countries
- Model w/ and w/out China as one of the CEs


Step 2 – Relate γ 's to Policies, Conditions, Institutions

$$\hat{\gamma}_{Fit}^C = \theta_0 + \theta_1 OMP_{Fit} + \theta_2 MC_{Fit} + \theta_3 LINK_{Fit} + \theta_4 INST_{Fit} + \theta_5 CRISIS_{Fit} + u_{Fit}. \quad (2)$$


- **OMP:** Open Macro Policies – Exchange rate stability, financial openness (Chinn-Ito), Int'l reserve accumulation
- **MC:** Macro conditions – infl. volatility, CA balances, public finances (budget balance or gov't gross debt)
- **LINK:** Import Demand by CEs, bank lending by CEs, FDI provided by CEs, degree of trade competition w/r/t CEs
- **INST:** LEGAL (PC of BQ, LAO, Anti-corrupt), Fin. Dev.
- **CRISIS:** currency and banking
- 1986-2012, 3-yr panels, about 60 countries
- $(i \times 3 \times t)$ γ 's

Proportion of Significant F-Tests


Policy Interest Rate




Stock Market Price Changes



Sovereign Term Spread



REER



First-Step Estimates: Summary

- The link with the CEs has been dominant for developing and emerging market economies in the last two decades
- The movements of policy interest rate and term spreads are more sensitive to global financial shocks in the late 1990s through early 2000s and since 2008
- China does not exert substantial influence in financial markets

Table 1-1: Factors Affecting Policy Interest Rate Sensitivity, 1986-2012

| | | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Open Macro Policy (OMP)</i> | Exchange rate stability | 4.862 (2.693)* | 3.392 (2.447) | 3.657 (2.448) | 3.098 (2.268) |
| | Financial openness | 5.455 (2.403)** | 5.777 (2.259)** | 7.930 (2.245)*** | 7.491 (2.154)*** |
| | IR Holding | -13.803 (7.342)* | -11.343 (6.541)* | -12.400 (6.254)** | -13.557 (5.820)** |
| | | | | | |
| <i>Macro. Conditions (MC)</i> | CA balance (%) | 19.282 (9.666)** | 24.284 (10.541)** | 41.092 (10.507)*** | 39.017 (10.451)*** |
| | Inflation Vol. | 19.270 (34.312) | 23.910 (15.012) | 9.839 (28.624) | 10.727 (12.515) |
| | Gross debt (%) | -0.963 (1.592) | | -1.420 (1.289) | |
| | Budget balance (%) | | -2.145 (15.342) | | 22.313 (16.492) |
| <i>External Link (LINK)</i> | Trade competition | -4.540 (9.166) | -6.454 (7.550) | -11.187 (7.868) | -11.246 (6.633)* |
| | Trade demand | 6.868 (11.125) | 8.340 (10.116) | 11.068 (9.170) | 11.898 (8.609) |
| | FDI from CEs | 49.264 (16.003)*** | 44.044 (15.113)*** | 42.633 (13.001)*** | 41.347 (12.732)*** |
| | | | | | |
| <i>Institutional Dev. (INST)</i> | Fin. Dev. | 9.570 (2.500)*** | 7.651 (2.427)*** | 8.137 (2.207)*** | 7.931 (2.168)*** |
| | Legal Dev. | -4.831 (6.555) | -5.933 (5.974) | -7.132 (5.530) | -7.115 (5.199) |
| <i>Crises (CRISIS)</i> | Currency crisis | -3.589 (2.595) | -2.712 (2.178) | -3.212 (2.167) | -3.422 (1.872)* |
| | Banking crisis | 0.544 (2.096) | 1.410 (1.838) | 0.766 (1.870) | 1.292 (1.676) |
| | | | | | |
| | N | 386 | 432 | 327 | 371 |
| | Adj. R2 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| | # of countries | 41 | 41 | 31 | 31 |

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| | Trade competition | -4.540 (9.166) | -6.454 (7.550) | -11.187 (7.868) | -11.246 (6.633)* |
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| <i>External Link (LINK)</i> | Trade competition | -4.540 (9.166) | -6.454 (7.550) | -11.187 (7.868) | -11.246 (6.633)* |
| | Trade demand | 6.868 (11.125) | 8.340 (10.116) | 11.068 (9.170) | 11.898 (8.609) |
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| | | | | | |
| | N | 386 | 432 | 327 | 371 |
| | Adj. R2 | 0.09 | 0.08 | 0.12 | 0.13 |
| | # of countries | 41 | 41 | 31 | 31 |

Table 1-2: Factors Affecting Stock Market Sensitivity, 1986-2012

| | | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| <i>Open Macro Policy (OMP)</i> | Exchange rate stability | -0.291 (0.124)** | -0.189 (0.125) | -0.318 (0.139)** | -0.220 (0.139) |
| | Financial openness | -0.207 (0.101)** | -0.101 (0.113) | -0.089 (0.116) | 0.013 (0.126) |
| | IR Holding | 0.133 (0.302) | -0.027 (0.326) | 0.216 (0.330) | 0.057 (0.368) |
| <i>Macro. Conditions (MC)</i> | CA balance (%) | -0.104 (0.384) | 0.341 (0.475) | -0.047 (0.545) | 0.381 (0.585) |
| | Inflation Vol. | 2.111 (1.618) | 1.341 (0.695)* | 1.400 (1.691) | 1.111 (0.716) |
| | Gross debt (%) | 0.171 (0.066)*** | | 0.175 (0.068)** | |
| | Budget balance (%) | | -0.714 (0.703) | | -0.840 (0.963) |
| <i>External Link (LINK)</i> | Trade competition | 0.692 (0.368)* | 0.712 (0.399)* | 0.441 (0.404) | 0.490 (0.434) |
| | Trade demand | -0.038 (0.452) | -0.003 (0.477) | 0.178 (0.473) | 0.198 (0.503) |
| | FDI from CEs | -1.040 (0.606)* | -0.431 (0.651) | -1.270 (0.626)** | -0.626 (0.676) |
| <i>Institutional Dev. (INST)</i> | Fin. Dev. | -0.202 (0.101)** | -0.154 (0.112) | -0.154 (0.110) | -0.108 (0.120) |
| | Legal Dev. | 0.008 (0.265) | -0.282 (0.276) | -0.015 (0.276) | -0.329 (0.287) |
| | | | | | |
| <i>Crises (CRISIS)</i> | Currency crisis | -0.052 (0.115) | -0.032 (0.109) | -0.058 (0.118) | -0.038 (0.112) |
| | Banking crisis | 0.008 (0.083) | -0.002 (0.085) | -0.003 (0.092) | -0.023 (0.094) |
| | | | | | |
| | <i>N</i> | 325 | 357 | 290 | 322 |
| | Adj. R2 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| | # of countries | 31 | 31 | 26 | 26 |

Table 1-3: Factors Affecting REER Sensitivity, 1986-2012

| | | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| <i>Open Macro Policy (OMP)</i> | Exchange rate stability | 0.718 (0.132)*** | 0.807 (0.121)*** | 0.725 (0.135)*** | 0.760 (0.123)*** |
| | Financial openness | 0.377 (0.126)*** | 0.311 (0.121)** | 0.157 (0.137) | 0.074 (0.132) |
| | IR Holding | 1.038 (0.334)*** | 0.919 (0.320)*** | 0.761 (0.331)** | 0.606 (0.314)* |
| | CA balance (%) | 0.921 (0.545)* | 0.459 (0.536) | 1.360 (0.563)** | 0.684 (0.553) |
| <i>Macro. Conditions (MC)</i> | Inflation Vol. | 2.824 (1.674)* | -0.840 (0.671) | 2.706 (1.672) | -0.868 (0.634) |
| | Gross debt (%) | -0.072 (0.078) | -0.138 (0.075)* | -0.138 (0.075)* | |
| | Budget balance (%) | | 1.018 (0.963) | | 2.366 (0.956)** |
| | Trade competition | -1.625 (0.427)*** | -1.262 (0.372)*** | -1.275 (0.429)*** | -0.866 (0.374)** |
| <i>External Link (LINK)</i> | Trade demand | 1.763 (0.483)*** | 1.877 (0.460)*** | 2.022 (0.463)*** | 2.151 (0.439)*** |
| | FDI from CEs | -0.335 (0.673) | -0.372 (0.668) | -0.110 (0.643) | -0.272 (0.639) |
| <i>Institutional Dev. (INST)</i> | Fin. Dev. | -0.171 (0.119) | -0.211 (0.117)* | -0.076 (0.119) | -0.125 (0.117) |
| | Legal Dev. | -0.007 (0.296) | -0.212 (0.290) | 0.076 (0.296) | -0.234 (0.289) |
| <i>Crises (CRISIS)</i> | Currency crisis | 0.282 (0.127)** | 0.165 (0.113) | 0.349 (0.120)*** | 0.207 (0.108)* |
| | Banking crisis | 0.001 (0.096) | -0.108 (0.087) | -0.092 (0.102) | -0.204 (0.091)** |
| | | <i>N</i> | 294 | 332 | 254 |
| | | Adj. R2 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.27 |
| | | # of countries | 30 | 30 | 23 |
| | | | | | 23 |

Table 1-3: Factors Affecting REER Sensitivity, 1986-2012

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| | Gross debt (%) | -0.072 (0.078) | | -0.138 (0.075)* | |
| | Budget balance (%) | | 1.018 (0.963) | | 2.366 (0.956)** |
| <i>External Link (LINK)</i> | Trade competition | -1.625 (0.427)*** | -1.262 (0.372)*** | -1.275 (0.429)*** | -0.866 (0.374)** |
| | Trade demand | 1.763 (0.483)*** | 1.877 (0.460)*** | 2.022 (0.463)*** | 2.151 (0.439)*** |
| | FDI from CEs | -0.335 (0.673) | -0.372 (0.668) | -0.110 (0.643) | -0.272 (0.639) |
| | | | | | |
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| | Legal Dev. | -0.007 (0.296) | -0.212 (0.290) | 0.076 (0.296) | -0.234 (0.289) |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| <i>Crises (CRISIS)</i> | Currency crisis | 0.282 (0.127)** | 0.165 (0.113) | 0.349 (0.120)*** | 0.207 (0.108)* |
| | Banking crisis | 0.001 (0.096) | -0.108 (0.087) | -0.092 (0.102) | -0.204 (0.091)** |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | <i>N</i> | 294 | 332 | 254 | 290 |
| | Adj. R2 | 0.22 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 0.28 |
| | # of countries | 30 | 30 | 23 | 23 |

Summary

- An economy that pursues greater exchange rate stability and financial openness would face a stronger link with the center economies through policy interest rates and real effective exchange rate movements

Table 2-1: Interactive Effects and Interest Rate Sensitivity

| | LDC (4) | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) | EMG (9) |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Exchange rate stability | 5.309 (2.751)* | -7.884 (7.206) | -11.771 (8.226) | 5.130 (2.570)** | -5.971 (5.128) | -3.383 (5.496) |
| Financial openness | -1.269 (5.169) | 6.516 (3.105)** | 5.335 (7.412) | 0.974 (4.436) | 9.544 (2.450)*** | 3.303 (4.863) |
| IR Holding | -12.865 (7.555)* | -13.232 (9.713) | -10.147 (10.706) | -10.817 (6.644) | -9.973 (7.006) | -9.538 (7.298) |
| CA balance (%) | 28.248 (23.271) | 41.970 (29.384) | 63.029 (39.890) | 19.791 (20.440) | 32.486 (22.619) | 21.459 (26.431) |
| Gross debt (%) | 0.497 (3.049) | -0.544 (4.196) | 1.770 (5.395) | -0.799 (2.508) | -0.481 (2.829) | 0.318 (3.406) |
| Trade demand | -4.779 (23.448) | -56.321 (26.507)** | -100.895 (40.442)** | -2.923 (19.569) | -23.766 (18.546) | -37.035 (26.549) |
| Fin. Dev. | 17.031 (4.719)*** | 30.152 (5.726)*** | 30.181 (7.591)*** | 17.133 (3.992)*** | 19.735 (3.985)*** | 23.187 (4.896)*** |
| KAO x CAB | -8.557 (31.196) | | -35.884 (44.266) | 41.950 (28.319) | | 32.968 (31.667) |
| KAO x Debt | -2.212 (5.014) | | -6.466 (7.066) | -1.060 (4.206) | | -1.710 (4.516) |
| KAO x Trade Demand | 16.625 (29.872) | | 43.098 (41.279) | 31.202 (25.211) | | 33.056 (26.674) |
| KAO x FD. | -15.549 (6.714)** | | 18.749 (9.583)* | -17.676 (5.954)*** | | -11.610 (6.511)* |
| ERS x CAB | | -49.790 (43.898) | -52.504 (49.343) | | 7.265 (35.144) | -2.590 (37.970) |
| ERS x Debt | | -3.001 (7.163) | -1.671 (7.990) | | -2.863 (4.841) | -2.430 (5.062) |
| ERS x Trade Demand | | 123.275 (48.777)** | 148.706 (53.871)*** | | 67.204 (35.799)* | 62.633 (36.936)* |
| ERS x FD. | | -30.529 (9.015)*** | -43.333 (10.280)*** | | -21.751 (6.665)*** | -16.831 (7.173)** |
| N | 386 | 386 | 386 | 327 | 327 | 327 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| # of countries | 41 | 41 | 41 | 31 | 31 | 31 |

Table 2-1: Interactive Effects and Interest Rate Sensitivity

| | LDC (4) | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) | EMG (9) |
|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Exchange rate stability | 5.309 (2.751)* | -7.884 (7.206) | -11.771 (8.226) | 5.130 (2.570)** | -5.971 (5.128) | -3.383 (5.496) |
| Financial openness | -1.269 (5.169) | 6.516 (3.105)** | 5.335 (7.412) | 0.974 (4.436) | 9.544 (2.450)*** | 3.303 (4.863) |
| IR Holding | -12.865 (7.555)* | -13.232 (9.713) | -10.147 (10.706) | -10.817 (6.644) | -9.973 (7.006) | -9.538 (7.298) |
| CA balance (%) | 28.248 (23.271) | 41.970 (29.384) | 63.029 (39.890) | 19.791 (20.440) | 32.486 (22.619) | 21.459 (26.431) |
| Gross debt (%) | 0.497 (3.049) | -0.544 (4.196) | 1.770 (5.395) | -0.799 (2.508) | -0.481 (2.829) | 0.318 (3.406) |
| Trade demand | -4.779 (23.448) | -56.321 (26.507)** | -100.895 (40.442)** | -2.923 (19.569) | -23.766 (18.546) | -37.035 (26.549) |
| Fin. Dev. | 17.031 (4.719)*** | 30.152 (5.726)*** | 30.181 (7.591)*** | 17.133 (3.992)*** | 19.735 (3.985)*** | 23.187 (4.896)*** |
| KAO x CAB | -8.557 (31.196) | | -35.884 (44.266) | 41.950 (28.319) | | 32.968 (31.667) |
| KAO x Debt | -2.212 (5.014) | | -6.466 (7.066) | -1.060 (4.206) | | -1.710 (4.516) |
| KAO x Trade Demand | 16.625 (29.872) | | 43.098 (41.279) | 31.202 (25.211) | | 33.056 (26.674) |
| KAO x FD. | -15.549 (6.714)** | | 18.749 (9.583)* | -17.676 (5.954)*** | | -11.610 (6.511)* |
| ERS x CAB | | -49.790 (43.898) | -52.504 (49.343) | | 7.265 (35.144) | -2.590 (37.970) |
| ERS x Debt | | -3.001 (7.163) | -1.671 (7.990) | | -2.863 (4.841) | -2.430 (5.062) |
| ERS x Trade Demand | | 123.275 (48.777)** | 148.706 (53.871)*** | | 67.204 (35.799)* | 62.633 (36.936)* |
| ERS x FD. | | -30.529 (9.015)*** | -43.333 (10.280)*** | | -21.751 (6.665)*** | -16.831 (7.173)** |
| N | 386 | 386 | 386 | 327 | 327 | 327 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| # of countries | 41 | 41 | 41 | 31 | 31 | 31 |

Table 2-3: Interactive Effects and REER Sensitivity

| | LDC (4) | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) | EMG (9) |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Exchange rate stability | 0.735 (0.134)*** | 0.552 (0.327)* | 0.566 (0.331)* | 0.743 (0.136)*** | 0.520 (0.329) | 0.528 (0.335) |
| Financial openness | 0.523 (0.277)* | 0.431 (0.122)*** | 0.537 (0.266)** | 0.381 (0.269) | 0.188 (0.131) | 0.392 (0.255) |
| IR Holding | 1.042 (0.344)*** | 1.682 (0.333)*** | 1.668 (0.342)*** | 0.717 (0.342)** | 1.188 (0.326)*** | 1.131 (0.339)*** |
| CA balance (%) | -0.139 (1.056) | -2.651 (1.024)** | -2.966 (1.285)** | 0.110 (1.044) | -0.849 (1.036) | -1.175 (1.217) |
| Gross debt (%) | -0.215 (0.155) | -0.435 (0.155)*** | -0.525 (0.195)*** | -0.278 (0.146)* | -0.464 (0.147)*** | -0.541 (0.184)*** |
| Trade demand | 1.920 (1.019)* | 1.135 (0.879) | 1.200 (1.286) | 2.404 (0.972)** | 1.030 (0.843) | 1.072 (1.212) |
| Fin. Dev. | -0.253 (0.217) | 0.461 (0.195)** | 0.371 (0.256) | -0.260 (0.213) | 0.475 (0.186)** | 0.276 (0.239) |
| KAO x CAB | 1.426 (1.424) | | 0.535 (1.383) | 1.873 (1.487) | | 0.533 (1.463) |
| KAO x Debt | 0.258 (0.249) | | 0.182 (0.242) | 0.247 (0.237) | | 0.151 (0.226) |
| KAO x Trade Demand | -0.052 (1.340) | | 0.052 (1.292) | -0.291 (1.279) | | 0.032 (1.215) |
| KAO x FD. | 0.087 (0.330) | | 0.078 (0.318) | 0.271 (0.337) | | 0.388 (0.324) |
| ERS x CAB | | 4.950 (1.640)*** | 4.834 (1.672)*** | | 2.873 (1.634)* | 2.722 (1.713) |
| ERS x Debt | | 0.727 (0.281)** | 0.714 (0.284)** | | 0.638 (0.273)** | 0.631 (0.277)** |
| ERS x Trade Demand | | 0.759 (1.750) | 0.748 (1.782) | | 1.893 (1.734) | 1.809 (1.761) |
| ERS x FD. | | -1.326 (0.348)*** | -1.280 (0.354)*** | | -1.217 (0.341)*** | -1.263 (0.354)*** |
| N | 294 | 294 | 294 | 254 | 254 | 254 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.37 | 0.36 |
| # of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 23 | 23 | 23 |

Table 2-3: Interactive Effects and REER Sensitivity

| | LDC (4) | LDC (5) | LDC (6) | EMG (7) | EMG (8) | EMG (9) |
|-------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|----------------------|
| Exchange rate stability | 0.735 (0.134)*** | 0.552 (0.327)* | 0.566 (0.331)* | 0.743 (0.136)*** | 0.520 (0.329) | 0.528 (0.335) |
| Financial openness | 0.523 (0.277)* | 0.431 (0.122)*** | 0.537 (0.266)** | 0.381 (0.269) | 0.188 (0.131) | 0.392 (0.255) |
| IR Holding | 1.042 (0.344)*** | 1.682 (0.333)*** | 1.668 (0.342)*** | 0.717 (0.342)** | 1.188 (0.326)*** | 1.131 (0.339)*** |
| CA balance (%) | -0.139 (1.056) | -2.651 (1.024)** | -2.966 (1.285)** | 0.110 (1.044) | -0.849 (1.036) | -1.175 (1.217) |
| Gross debt (%) | -0.215 (0.155) | -0.435 (0.155)*** | -0.525 (0.195)*** | -0.278 (0.146)* | -0.464 (0.147)*** | -0.541 (0.184)*** |
| Trade demand | 1.920 (1.019)* | 1.135 (0.879) | 1.200 (1.286) | 2.404 (0.972)** | 1.030 (0.843) | 1.072 (1.212) |
| Fin. Dev. | -0.253 (0.217) | 0.461 (0.195)** | 0.371 (0.256) | -0.260 (0.213) | 0.475 (0.186)** | 0.276 (0.239) |
| KAO x CAB | 1.426 (1.424) | | 0.535 (1.383) | 1.873 (1.487) | | 0.533 (1.463) |
| KAO x Debt | 0.258 (0.249) | | 0.182 (0.242) | 0.247 (0.237) | | 0.151 (0.226) |
| KAO x Trade Demand | -0.052 (1.340) | | 0.052 (1.292) | -0.291 (1.279) | | 0.032 (1.215) |
| KAO x FD. | 0.087 (0.330) | | 0.078 (0.318) | 0.271 (0.337) | | 0.388 (0.324) |
| ERS x CAB | | 4.950 (1.640)*** | 4.834 (1.672)*** | | 2.873 (1.634)* | 2.722 (1.713) |
| ERS x Debt | | 0.727 (0.281)** | 0.714 (0.284)** | | 0.638 (0.273)** | 0.631 (0.277)** |
| ERS x Trade Demand | | 0.759 (1.750) | 0.748 (1.782) | | 1.893 (1.734) | 1.809 (1.761) |
| ERS x FD. | | -1.326 (0.348)*** | -1.280 (0.354)*** | | -1.217 (0.341)*** | -1.263 (0.354)*** |
| N | 294 | 294 | 294 | 254 | 254 | 254 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.37 | 0.36 |
| # of countries | 30 | 30 | 30 | 23 | 23 | 23 |

$$(\beta_0 + \beta_1 ERS + \beta_2 KAOPEN) \Delta X$$

MM-MM Estimation

(a) Effect of Financial Development
(+10 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN* | | |
|------|------|---------|-------|------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | 3.02 | 3.96 | 4.89 |
| | 0.50 | 0.85 | 1.79 | 2.73 |
| | 1.00 | -1.32 | -0.38 | 0.56 |

(b) Effect of Trade Demand (+5 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN | | |
|------|------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | -5.04 | -3.97 | -2.89 |
| | 0.50 | -1.33 | -0.25 | 0.83 |
| | 1.00 | 2.39 | 3.47 | 4.55 |

SMT-SMT Estimation

(c) Effect of Trade Demand (+5 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN | | |
|------|------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | -0.07 | -0.07 | -0.08 |
| | 0.50 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | 1.00 | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.09 |

REER-REER Estimation

(e) Effect of CAB Deterioration
(-2 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN | | |
|------|------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| | 0.50 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| | 1.00 | -0.04 | -0.04 | -0.05 |

(f) Effect of Gross Debt (+10 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN | | |
|------|------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | -0.05 | -0.04 | -0.03 |
| | 0.50 | -0.02 | -0.01 | 0.00 |
| | 1.00 | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 |

(g) Effect of Financial Development
(+10 ppt)

| | | KAOPEN | | |
|------|------|--------|-------|-------|
| | | 0.00 | 0.50 | 1.00 |
| ERS* | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| | 0.50 | -0.03 | -0.02 | -0.02 |
| | 1.00 | -0.09 | -0.09 | -0.08 |

Summary

- Greater import demand for a developing country increases policy interest rate or stock market price correlations when the exchange rate stability is greater
- Greater exchange rate stability also amplifies the impact of greater gross debt on the REER link

What about the link between

- Country i 's **Exchange Market Pressure (EMP)** and
- The CE's financial variables, i.e.,
 - policy interest rates
 - REER
 - EMP
- We repeat the two-step approach
- **The gamma now refers to the correlation between the EMP and the CE's financial variables**
- The CE's REER matters more than policy interest rates

Table 5: Exchange Market Pressure Sensitivity to Core Economies' Conditions, 1986-2012

| | Corr. b/w CE's MM and Countries' EMP | | | Corr. b/w CE's REER and Countries' EMP | | | Corr. b/w CE's EMP and Countries' EMP | | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--|-------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| | FULL (1) | LDC (2) | EMG (3) | FULL (4) | LDC (5) | EMG (6) | FULL (7) | LDC (8) | EMG (9) |
| Exchange rate stability | -186.31 (171.16) | -84.62 (371.54) | -161.73 (314.44) | 8.351 (6.225) | 19.587 (6.890)*** | 18.713 (7.407)** | -0.277 (0.220) | 0.402 (0.302) | 0.439 (0.322) |
| Financial openness | 51.15 (153.17) | -258.35 (331.24) | -262.67 (272.59) | -10.296 (5.571)* | -21.161 (6.143)*** | -17.558 (6.421)*** | -0.204 (0.197) | 0.097 (0.269) | 0.118 (0.280) |
| IR Holding | 561.50 (245.98)** | 1,090.15 (487.00)** | 888.59 (427.27)** | -20.095 (8.947)** | -14.726 (9.031) | -6.901 (10.064) | 0.460 (0.317) | -0.058 (0.395) | -0.087 (0.438) |
| CA balance (%) | -593.36 (1,051.28) | -2,641.66 (1,780.93) | -652.60 (1,482.22) | 59.261 (38.237) | 67.269 (33.026)** | 28.283 (34.914) | 1.191 (1.353) | 0.973 (1.446) | 2.029 (1.520) |
| Gross debt (%) | -156.83 (131.08) | -313.78 (241.32) | -240.79 (191.05) | -5.544 (4.768) | -2.352 (4.475) | -0.804 (4.500) | -0.029 (0.169) | -0.281 (0.196) | -0.357 (0.196)* |
| Trade demand | -537.11 (992.73) | -1,027.42 (1,784.10) | -2,726.26 (1,478.31)* | 39.433 (36.107) | 8.589 (33.085) | 14.270 (34.822) | -2.600 (1.278)** | -3.573 (1.448)** | -3.522 (1.516)** |
| Fin. Dev. | -250.45 (202.33) | -500.85 (342.08) | -276.97 (280.57) | -11.077 (7.359) | -10.351 (6.344) | -12.094 (6.609)* | 0.827 (0.260)*** | 0.495 (0.278)* | 0.240 (0.288) |
| KAO x CAB | -1,912.78 (1,103.96)* | -2,522.00 (1,990.26) | -817.90 (1,803.57) | -54.082 (40.153) | -24.893 (36.908) | -68.213 (42.483) | -3.164 (1.421)** | -3.496 (1.616)** | -2.907 (1.849) |
| KAO x Debt | -122.31 (147.74) | -129.68 (312.96) | -39.58 (251.57) | 5.922 (5.373) | -7.144 (5.804) | -5.077 (5.926) | -0.108 (0.190) | -0.170 (0.254) | -0.198 (0.258) |
| KAO x Trade Demand | -32.80 (1,022.77) | 748.99 (1,834.10) | 984.54 (1,487.89) | -21.672 (37.200) | 18.136 (34.012) | -0.896 (35.047) | 4.677 (1.317)*** | 5.619 (1.489)*** | 5.333 (1.526)*** |
| KAO x FD. | 514.79 (216.95)** | 56.77 (427.73) | -304.72 (364.40) | -8.619 (7.891) | -16.551 (7.932)** | -19.001 (8.584)** | -0.635 (0.279)** | -0.326 (0.347) | -0.243 (0.374) |
| ERS x CAB | 4,295.00 (1,219.04)*** | 6,439.94 (2,204.84)*** | 2,488.60 (2,141.21) | -65.220 (44.338) | -108.129 (40.888)*** | -1.265 (50.437) | 3.797 (1.569)** | 4.131 (1.790)** | 1.684 (2.196) |
| ERS x Debt | 269.16 (188.07) | 508.41 (358.44) | 298.50 (286.88) | 6.127 (6.840) | 10.041 (6.647) | 6.626 (6.758) | -0.013 (0.242) | 0.313 (0.291) | 0.431 (0.294) |
| ERS x Trade Demand | 2,276.38 (1,168.05)* | 3,485.31 (2,392.58) | 4,992.84 (2,099.68)** | -75.257 (42.484)* | -90.629 (44.369)** | -89.484 (49.458)* | -1.263 (1.504) | -2.984 (1.942) | -2.035 (2.153) |
| ERS x FD. | -783.07 (254.94)*** | -502.29 (471.76) | 97.01 (426.71) | 17.335 (9.273)* | 26.167 (8.749)*** | 32.941 (10.051)*** | -0.510 (0.328) | -0.038 (0.383) | 0.225 (0.438) |
| <i>N</i> | 625 | 382 | 321 | 625 | 382 | 320 | 625 | 382 | 321 |
| Adj. R2 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 0.16 | 0.22 | 0.31 | 0.32 |
| # of countries | 59 | 40 | 30 | 59 | 40 | 30 | 59 | 40 | 30 |

Summary

- The greater exchange rate stability or less of financial openness a country pursues, the more **financial development** makes its economy's **EMP** levels more sensitive to changes in the center economies' **REER**
- If a non-center economy runs a **current account deficit**, its **EMP** sensitivity to the **REER** of the CEs rises esp. when it pursues greater exchange rate stability
- A **CA deficit** country finds its **EMP** more positively correlated with the **EMP** of the CEs if it pursues greater financial openness and greater exchange rate *flexibility*
- Having greater **trade linkages** with the CE contributes to more positive **EMP-EMP** linkages if a country pursues greater financial openness.

Concluding Remarks

- The link with the CEs has been dominant for developing and emerging market economies
- China does not exert substantial influence in financial markets (**so far**)
- Exchange rate regime and financial openness have *direct* influences on the sensitivity to the CEs.
 - An economy with greater exchange rate stability and financial openness would face a stronger link with the CEs through policy interest rates and REER movements.
- And *interactive* effects with CAB, gross nat'l debt, trade demand, and financial development.
 - A PH with stronger trade ties with the CEs and with greater exchange rate stability and financial openness would face stronger sensitivity through policy interest rates or stock market price movements.
 - Such a policy arrangement would also make the impact of having greater gross debt on the PH-CE REER link bigger.

Concluding Remarks

- The EMP of the PHs is sensitive to the movements of the CEs' REER and EMP during the GFC and the following period.
- A PH with higher levels of financial development can mitigate the effect of changes in the center economies' policy interest rates on the level of EMP it faces.
- The real appreciation of the CEs could lead to higher EMP of the PHs
- Higher levels of financial development, greater financial openness, strong trade ties with the CEs, and more stable inflation would help reduce the EMP sensitivity to CEs' REER.
- There are interaction effects b/w open macro policies and macroeconomic and institutional conditions.

Concluding Remarks

- Open macro policy choice is “*still*” dictated by the trilemma hypothesis.
- The types of exchange rate regimes do affect the extent of sensitivity to changes in CEs’ financial conditions or policies.